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Abstract
This Note will address the plight of Serbian conscientious objectors who fled Serbia in the
aftermath of NATO’s involvement in Kosovo. Part I discusses refugee definitions and mechanisms
for managing the refugee crises. Part I also examines the Balkan conflict, focusing on the NATO
bombings, the exodus of refugees from the region and the subgroup of Serbian draft evaders to
Hungary. Part II compares two legal methods for managing refugee crises. Part III argues for
a hybrid solution, combining the individualized and collectivized approaches, to handle Serbian
conscientious objector refugees.
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THE AFTERMATH OF THE NATO BOMBING:
APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING
THE PROBLEM OF SERBIAN
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Alexandra McGinley*
"Unfortunately, the one thing historical experience has
taught... is that nobody ever seems to learn from it. Still we
must go on trying."
-Eric Hobsbawml
INTRODUCTION
Milan was a shopkeeper in Serbia.2 One afternoon, in April
1999, he voiced his opposition to the war in Kosovo' during a
gathering outside his store.4 Within twenty-four hours military
police detained and interrogated Milan at the local police sta-
tion.5 Twenty-four hours later, Milan received a draft notice.6 In
order to avoid conscription, requiring him to fight in a war he
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also acknowledges Sanu Thomas and Robin Gise for their helpful suggestions and ad-
vice. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Thomas and Marian Imperato.
1. See Eric Alterman, Untangling Balkan Knots of Myth and Countermyth, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 1999, at B9 (quoting historian).
2. Amnesty International Report, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Forgotten Resist-
ers: The Plight of Conscientious Objectors to Military Service After the Conflict in Kosovo, EUR/
70/111/99, 10 (1999), also in Amnesty International (visited Nov. 13, 1999) <http://
www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999/EUR/47011199.htm> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal) [hereinafter Amnesty Report].
3. See generally NOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo 1-2 (1998) (describing Kosovo as autono-
mous province within Serbia, bordering on Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia).
4. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that Milan stated publicly that
President Slobodan Milosevic "is always pushing us into wars," and that Serbians were
"becoming genocidal people").
5. See id. (stating that Milan was slapped by Serbian police officer while in custody
and told not to make such comments during wartime).
6. See id. (describing that call-up notice was delivered to Milan's house). Milan's
wife was home and refused to sign for the notice. Id. Officials left the papers pinned to
the door. Id.
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opposed, the shopkeeper embarked on an odyssey.7 He went
into hiding in Serbia until the military police discovered his
whereabouts and placed him in prison.8 He escaped while being
transferred to another prison and slipped back into hiding.9 Fi-
nally he crossed the border from Serbia to Hungary after bribing
the border patrol. 10 At the time of his interview with Amnesty
International," Milan was living in temporary housing in Hun-
gary.' 2
Prior to residing in Debrecen, 13 a refugee camp in eastern
Hungary, Goran lived in the Yugoslav countryside. 4 An ethnic
Serbian, he was a technician by trade and had been building a
ranch with his family. 5 On March 31, 1999, seven days after the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 16 ("NATO") began Opera-
tion Allied Force,17 the Serbian military police appeared at
Goran's house to notify him that he had been called up for ser-
7. See id. (recounting details of Milan's escape into hiding).
8. See id. (describing that Milan was detained in prison along with three other
conscientious objectors).
9. See id. (detailing Milan's escape from prison). Serbian police boarded detainees
on a truck, and Milan jumped off and ran off into hiding. Id. After Milan escaped
police custody, the police searched his home. Id.
10. See ia. (claiming that Milan drove across Serbian border with false registration
plates).
11. See Amnesty International, (visited Apr. 3, 2000) <http://w.web.amnesty.
org/web> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (explaining that Amnesty
International is organization that promotes human rights worldwide). See generally
EGON LARSEN, A FLA.Nm IN BARBED WiNE, THE STORY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 7
(1979) (chronicling history of Amnesty International).
12. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that Milan's wife and children
have joined him in Hungary). He told Amnesty investigators that he did not know of
his options as a refugee. Id.
13. See Mark Schapiro, Serbia's Lost Generation, MOTHERJONES, Sept. 1, 1999 (noting
that Debrecen, located in eastern Hungary, was Soviet army camp). Now, it is the larg-
est of the three main Hungarian reception centers for refugees. Id.; see also Hungarian
Refugee Centres Virtually Full, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 20, 1999 (reporting
that other two camps are Bicske, located west of Budapest, and Bekescsaba in southeast-
ern Hungary). Vese, is a smaller camp located in southwestern Hungary. Hungarian
Refugee, supra.
14. See Veronique Mistiaen, An Army in No Man's Land: As Bombs Fell on Begrade,
NATO Called for Yugoslav Soldiers To Turn Against Milosevic, GuARDMAN, Dec. 29, 1999
(stating that Goran was 28 years old).
15. See id. (stating that home was for himself, his mother, father, and sister).
16. See MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 894 (4th ed. 1997) (explaining that
United States, Canada, and 14 European States created North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion ("NATO") in 1949). These states created NATO after World War II to protect
against possible threats from Eastern bloc states. I&.
17. See Jane Perlez, NATO Authorizes Air Attacks; Primakov Angry, Drops U.S. Visit,
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vice."' He was not at home, and his sister alerted him to the
notice by telephone.' 9 Immediately, he fled north to Hungary.20
Once in Hungary, he moved to two different camps before set-
ding at Debrecen.2'
Milan and Goran are part of a group of over 15,00022 Ser-
bian military deserters, 2 3 who fled Serbia 24 in opposition to Ser-
bian aggression in Kosovo.2 5 Currently, no country involved in
N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 24, 1999 at Al (reporting that NATO military intervention against
Serbia began on Wednesday, March 24, 1999).
18. See David J. Lynch, Neutral Montenegro Becomes Haven for Young Men Opposed to
War, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 1999, at 5A (stating that males age 18 to 65 were draft eligible
during NATO war).
19. See Mistiaen, supra note 14, at A17 (explaining that Goran did not agree with
Milosevic's policies).
20. See id. (discussing that immediately after Goran's sister told him of draft notice,
he crossed border to Hungary).
21. See id. (explaining that officials at Debrecen denied Goran's asylum applica-
tion). He is awaiting an appeal. Id. There are also many former Serbian political activ-
ists, student demonstrators, and young male draft dodgers living in exile in Budapest.
Id.; see also Adam Lebor, Histoy Repeats Itselffor Serbs in Exile, ScoTsMAN, Apr. 24, 1999, at
9 (reporting that Milos, student, sensing that he would be drafted once NATO strikes
began, fled to Budapest, where there is informal network in place for young, educated,
former opposition members to find housing and employment). Milos noted,
I knew what was coming. I already had a lot of problems with the state and the
police because of my political activities. I was repeatedly arrested, harassed
and advised it would be best not to be involved in politics any more .... I got
out just in time, my call-up papers for the army arrived a few days later.
Lebor, supra.
22. See Schapiro, supra note 13 (citing to Refugee Action Project, Budapest-based
organization, statistics estimating that 15,000 to 20,000 of 50,000 Serbians who fled dur-
ing bombings were draft evaders).
23. See Uli Schmetzer, On the Beach with Yugoslav Draft Dodgers; Unpopular War Leaves
Thousands Hidingfrom Police in Montenegro, CHi. TRm.,July 28, 1999, at 4 (estimating that
approximately 40,000 men across Yugoslavia refused to be called up by Serbian mili-
tary).
24. See Europe's Roughest Neighbourhood, ECONOMISTJan. 24, 1998, at 3 (noting irreg-
ular Balkan nomenclature since 1989). Currently, two republics, Montenegro and Ser-
bia, comprise the federal entity called Yugoslavia. Id. Serbia refers to the republic
within Yugoslavia. Id.; see also Montenegrin Assembly Adopts Amnesty Law for Draft-Dodgers,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 12, 1999 (reporting that Montenegro granted amnesty to
draft evaders from war in Kosovo, in defiance of Serbia's laws).
25. See Lynch, supra note 18, at 5A (discussing that in addition to Hungary,
thousands of deserters fled to Montenegro); see alsoJohn Phillips, Deserters Refused Refuge
by Struggling Italians, TIMES (LoumON), Apr. 30, 1999 (describing plight of Yugoslav
army deserters in Italy); Schmetzer, supra note 23, at 4 (detailing locations to which
deserters have fled). Still other Serbian conscientious objectors, already in the United
States, fought removal during the conflict because they fear the draft. Schmetzer,
supra; see Neil MacFarquhar, Crisis in the Balkans: The U.S. Haven; Albanians and Serbs
Seek To Halt Deportation, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1999, at 9 (recognizing that many evaders
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the Kosovo conflict has offered Serbians conscientious objectors
who fled Serbia a permanent settlement option, despite the fact
that the objectors face severe penalties if they returned home.26
Their futures are uncertain if they remain in refugee camps or
in inadequate temporary housing.27 The international commu-
nity's inaction, particularly the NATO States,28 is significant
since during the bombings, NATO agents dropped leaflets and
launched a propaganda campaign, aimed at encouraging Serbi-
ans to desert the military.
29
This Note will address the plight of Serbian conscientious
objectors who fled Serbia in the aftermath of NATO's involve-
ment in Kosovo. Currently, they are unable to find permanent
resettlement in other states. Part I discusses refugee definitions
and mechanisms for managing the refugee crises. It outlines
current protections afforded conscientious objectors in interna-
tional law. Finally, Part I examines the Balkan conflict, focusing
on the NATO bombings, the exodus of refugees from the re-
gion, and the subgroup of Serbian draft evaders to Hungary.
Part II compares two legal methods for managing refugee crises:
feared they were more likely to be singled out for punishment because they were com-
ing from United States).
26. See The Plight of Kosovo"s Displaced and Imprisoned Detailed by Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, PR NEwsviwRE, Feb. 28, 2000 (urging United States to recog-
nize plight of Serbian conscientious objectors and to assist them in resettling in United
States). Bill Frelick, Director of Policy, U.S. Committee for Refugees stated:
[t]he U.S. Government and other donors should direct bilateral funding to
international nongovernmental organizations to develop alternative networks
to deliver humanitarian assistance in Serbia .... President Clinton should
issue a presidential determination permitting the United States to consider
admitting certain categories of internally displaced persons in the FRY as refu-
gees for purposes of the U.S. resettlement program; and the following vulnera-
ble groups such as... Serbian conscientious objectors.
Id.
27. See generally Amnesty Report, supra note 2, at 4-5 (discussing that conscientious
objectors have no long-term security in refugee camps and face long prison sentences if
returned to Yugoslavia).
28. See generally id. at 2 (contending NATO dropped millions of leaflets overYugo-
slav countryside).
29. See Testimony of Carlos M. Salinas, Advocacy Director Latin America and the Carib-
bean House International Relations International Economic Policy and Trade Human Rights
Report, FDCH CONGRESSIONAL TESrIMONY, Mar. 7, 2000 (declaring "the failure to pro-
vide a full picture of the danger of prosecution facing Serbian conscientious objectors is
particularly reprehensible, considering that the U.S. government and... North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization [sic] (NATO) allies vigorously encouraged Serb men to resist
military service during the NATO campaign in Kosovo"); see also Amnesty Report, supra
note 2 (itemizing various methods NATO actors used to coax Serbians to resist draft).
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the individualized approach and the collectivized approach.
Part III argues for a hybrid solution, combining the individual-
ized and collectivized approaches, to handle Serbian conscien-
tious objector refugees. The hybrid approach recognizes the
Serbian conscientious objectors' right to object to service, and it
shares the burden of their care among NATO States. This pro-
posal, although derived from the Serbian refugee predicament,
applies to future groups of conscientious objectors, uprooted
and forced from their homeland because of generalized violence
or civil war.
I. INTERMATIONAL PRNCIPLES ON THE TREATMENT OF
REFUGEES, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, AND
THE BALKAN CONFLICT
Experts note that the 1948 Universal Declarations of
Human Rights 0 (or "UDHR"), sets out basic rights and free-
doms for all individuals."' The right to seek asylum was included
among the UDHR enumerated rights. 32 Three years later the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees33 (or "1951
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (HI), U.N. GAOR 3d.
Sess Pt. 1, pmbl., at 1, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). [hereinafter UDHR].
[T]he General Assembly proclaims this universal declaration of human rights
as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the
end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect
for these rights and freedoms ....
Id.
31. See GuY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 7 (2d. ed. 1996)
(discussing impact U.N. instruments such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") has had in forming legal basis for concept of refugee).
32. See UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 14(1) (stating that "everyone has the right to
seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution").
33. See 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, pmbl [hereinafter 1951 Convention] (stating that "all States, recognizing
the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything
within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between
states"); see also OFFICE OF THE UNTED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 3 (1988)
[hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK] (stating that Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the
United Nations adopted the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1951
Convention") onJuly 28, 1951). It entered into force on April 21, 1954. OFFCE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, supra; see DEBORAH E. ANEER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 9,
10 n.44 (1999) (discussing that U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (or
"UNHCHR") wrote booklet to provide guidance to government officials in determining
refugee status).
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Convention"), defined who may be classified as a refugee (or
"Convention refugee") and thus qualify for asylum protection. 4
The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 5 (or
"1967 Protocol") further refined the 1951 Convention defini-
tion. 6 Other organizations have expanded the basic Conven-
tion refugee definition to include those who face generalized
persecution as a result of civil war.37 Just as the refugee defini-
tion has evolved over the last half-century so too have non-
refoulement,3 8 asylum 3 9 and temporary protection,4" and the ba-
sic mechanisms for refugee protection. 41 Under this interna-
tional refugee protection canopy rests recognized principles for
managing wartime conscientious objectors.42 As a general rule,
34. See GooDwIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing restrictive criteria used by
states to identify who benefits from refugee status and asylum).
35. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter 1967 Protocol] (stating that "new refugee situations have arisen since the
Convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within
the scope of the [1951] Convention").
36. See GooDWIN-GiLL, supra, note 31, at 20 (stating that 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1967 Protocol") are primary instru-
ments regarding refugees).
37. See OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, pmbl. (stating that commission was concerned
over "the constantly increasing numbers of refugees in Africa and desirous of finding
ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing them with a
better life and future") [hereinafter OAU Convention]; see also Richard A.C. Cort, Com-
ment, Resettlement of Refugees: National or InternationalDuty?, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 307, 316-
17 (1997) (observing that regional approaches, such as Organization of African Unity
(or "OAU"), recognize that refugees, for whatever reason, pose threat to stability of
region and that nations of each region have duty to assist regional refugees); Susan
Martin, et. al., Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framewor*, 12
GEo. IMIMIG. LJ. 543, 560 (1998) (noting that 42 African governments were signatories
to this convention).
38. See ATLa GRAHL-MADSEN, TuE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
(1966) (discussing non-refoulement principle as one that provides refugees with pro-
tection against forcible return to territory where they face political persecution); see also
GOODwIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 117 (detailing contours of non-refoulement).
39. See GOODWIN-GIL, supra note 31, at 173 (discussing asylum as protection given
by state to foreign national against exercise of jurisdiction by another state).
40. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends Towards Temporary "Refuge" and
Local Responses to Forced Migration, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 13, 16 (1994) (describing temporary
protection as generally applying to non-1951 Convention refugees, identified by gov-
ernment in which they seek asylum and who will be returned home eventually).
41. See id. (discussing how immigration policies have evolved in European states).
42. See Karen Musalo, Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide
Refuge to Young Men Who Refuse To Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26 SAN DIEGO L.R.
849, 850 n.9 (1989) (defining conscientious objector as one who refuses to participate
in armed conflict, and bases his or her objection to military service on religious, moral,
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although states have the power to conscript their citizens for ac-
tive military duty,43 conscientious objectors may still qualify for
refugee status if the objector would be persecuted because of his
or her anti-war beliefs.' Many Serbians, war-weary from a dec-
ade of civil turmoil and cognizant of Serbian military atrocities
in the former Yugoslavia, have fled Serbia because they refused
to participate in another conflict.45
A. The U.N. Definition of Refugees and Regional Alternatives
Commentators note that the 1951 Convention refugee defi-
nition significantly impacted the treatment of refugees in inter-
national law.46 Some critics have charged, however, that the
1951 Convention definition is not as viable in a post-Cold War
world because it is limited to individualized cases of persecu-
ethical, humanitarian, or philosophical convictions); see also Matthew Lippman, The Rec-
ognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an International Human Right, 21
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 31, 31 (1991) (defining conscientious objection as refusal to partici-
pate in armed services due to opposition to war); see also Russell Wolff, Conscientious
Objection: Time for Recognition as a Fundamental Human Right, 6 ASI.S INT'L LJ. 65, 68
(1982) (emphasizing that feelings of conscience should not be equated with religious
motivations). Wolff, supra. One does not have to base his or her objection to service on
religious beliefs. Id.; see also Marie-France Major, Conscientious Objection and International
Law: A Human Right, 24 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 349, 350 (1992) (classifying conscience
as ethical conviction that may flow from either religious or humanist beliefs).
43. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, para. 167-74 (stating that "person is clearly
not refugee if his only reason for desertion or draft evasion is his dislike of military
service or fear of combat"). The U.N. Handbook also asserts that although punishment
for draft evasion varies among states it does not normally constitute persecution. Id.
44. See id. para. 170 (stating that one may be refugee if "a person can show that the
performance of military service would have required his participation in military action
contrary to his genuine political, religious, or moral convictions or to valid reasons of
conscience"); see also id. at para 171 (stating that another valid reason for draft evasion
is where "the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associ-
ated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human
conduct").
45. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2 (discussing Serbian conscientious objector
predicament).
46. See ANKR, supra note 33, at 9 (explaining that U.S. Congress enacted Refugee
Act of 1980 to bring provisions of U.S. law in line with 1951 Convention); see also Scott
Busby, The Politics of Protection: Limits and Possibilities in the Implementation of International
Refugee Norms in the United States, 15 BER- J. INT'L L. 27, 27 (recognizing that refugee law
is rare example of U.S. domestic law being based on international law); IAN MACDONALD
& NIcHoLAs BLAKE, MACDONALD'S IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 372 (4th ed. 1995)
(noting that United Kingdom is party to 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol); States
Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, 18
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 213 (1999) (stating that nearly 140 states are now parties to either or
both instruments).
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tion.47 Regional agreements, such as the Organization of Afri-
can Unity' ("OAU") and the Cartagena Declaration on Reft-
gees49 ("Cartagena Declaration"), have broadened the definition
of refugee to include those who face persecution because of gen-
eralized violence or civil war.5 °
1. U.N. Definitions
Scholars note the U.N. Charter5 ' (or "Charter") recognized
the need for the international community, in the aftermath of
World War II, to protect human rights. 52 In 1948, members of
the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization53
47. See Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to International Refugee Protection, 26
CORNEL. INT'L LJ. 495, 496-98 (1993) (discussing emergence of new refugee situations,
never imagined at time 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol were adopted, such as rape
and forced impregnation as weapons of war, or mass relocation of populations for envi-
ronmental reasons). Scholars argue that the 1951 Convention was useful during the
Cold War, but that it is outdated today. Id. at 498; see also Arthur C. Helton & Eliana
Jacobs, What Is Forced Migration?, 13 GEO. IMMIGL LJ. 521, 522 (1999) (explaining that
neither 1951 Convention nor 1967 Protocol applies to those who flee across border
from threats posed by war or by other circumstances of generalized violence).
48. See OAU Convention, supra note 37 (noting increasing numbers of refugees in
Africa).
49. See Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 1984, reprinted in 2 UNHCR, CoL-
LECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS CONCERNING REFU-
GEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 206, UN Sales No. GV. E. 96.0.2
(1995) [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration]. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
("Cartagena Declaration") provided a refugee definition that includes
[i]n addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country be-
cause their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized vio-
lence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights
or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.
Id.; see also Martin, et. al., supra note 37, at 560 (calculating that 10 Latin American
states adopted this convention).
50. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 19-20 (recognizing fact that 1951 Conven-
tion definition does not apply to every refugee). The OAU and the Cartagena Declara-
tion have tried to improve on the 1951 Convention definition. Id. at 20-21.
51. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153.
52. See Scott L Porter, Comment, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Does It
Have Enough Force of Law To Hold "States" Party to the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina Legally
Accountable in the International Court of Justice, 3 TULSA J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 141, 141
(1995) (noting that scope of Holocaust atrocities compelled international community
to recognize universal human rights). See generallyJerome J. Shestack, The World Had a
Dream: Forty Years Ago, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Was Issued. A Look at
What Has Happened Since, 15 Sum. Hum. Rrs. 16, 16 (1988) (stating that Holocaust pro-
vided impetus for international human rights protection).
53. See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 173 (1958)
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("UNESCO"), drafted the UDHR54 and identified fundamental
rights that should apply to all individuals. 55 According to Article
14 of the UDHR, everyone has the right to seek asylum.56 States,
however, have an international legal duty to protect only those
who are categorized as refugees.57 The 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees 8 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees5 9 state a refugee definition that has influ-
enced immigration policy in many states.6 °
a. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The U.N. Charter 6 1 emphasized the international commu-
(discussing that U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"),
was founded in 1945); see also SHAw, supra note 16, at 252 (describing that UNESCO's
aim is to assist in maintaining peace and security by promoting educational, scientific,
and cultural collaboration across states).
54. See UDHR, supra note 30 (quoting UDHR's preamble); see also W. Michael
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 866 (1990) (noting that UDHR is not legally binding document, but some consider it
to embody customary international law); Imre Szabo, Historical Foundations of Human
Rights and Subsequent Developments, 1 INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11,
24 (Karel Vasek & Philip Aiston eds., 1982) (arguing that most international human
rights documents discuss UDHR).
55. See Porter, supra note 52, at 141 (asserting that U.N. purpose was to maintain
peace, security, and to promote human rights).
56. See UDHR, supra note 30, art. 14(1) (stating that "Everyone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution").
57. See GooDwiN-GiLL, supra note 31, at 32 (stating that legal consequences stem
from formal definition of refugee). States may, however, have their own methods of
determining refugee status that differs from the U.N. definition. Id.
58. 1951 Convention, supra note 33, at art. 1 (A) (2). Article 1 (A) (2) states that
the term 'refugee" shall apply to any person who .. . [a]s a result of events
occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being per-
secuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, in unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id.
59. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 35, art. 1(2) (removing 1951 Convention's tempo-
ral and geographic limitations and stating that "for the purposes of the present Proto-
col, the term "refugee" shall... mean any person within the definition of article 1 of
the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951
and..." and the words ". . . as a result of such events," in article 1A(2) were omitted").
60. See ANKER, supra note 33 (discussing the 1951 Convention definition's impact
on domestic laws).
61. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 53, at 1 (1958) (recounting development of
U.N. Charter, adopted on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco). See United Nations, (visited
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nity's desire to standardize human rights in the wake of World
War 11.62 The Charter, however, did not precisely define human
rights.63 To enumerate these concepts more completely, the
U.N. High Commission for Human Rights,64 established by
UNESCO, 65 drafted the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human
Rights. 66 The UDHR is one of several important documents that
form the basis of modem human rights in international law,
67
setting out fundamental rights that all people68 should enjoy,
such as the right to life, liberty, and security of person.69 Article
13 of the UDHR states that freedom of movement is a basic
human right.7° Additionally, the right of asylum is an estab-
lished principle in the UDHR. 71 Freedom of movement, how-
ever, has been interpreted to grant a sovereign state power to
grant or deny asylum within its boundaries. 72 This right is not
focused on the fight of an individual to obtain asylum.73
Apr. 3, 2000) <http://vv.un.org/overview/origin.html> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal) (noting that representatives of 50 nations drew up the Charter
at U.N. Conference on International Organization).
62. U.N. Charter, art. 1(3) (stating that central purposes of the United Nations is
"[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems... and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all...").
63. See Porter, supra note 52, at 141 (recognizing that U.N. Charter did not fully
define fundamental human rights and freedoms).
64. See Shestack, supra note 52, at 16 (stating that U.N. Commission on Human
Rights' purpose was to draft proposals regarding international bill of rights, including
protection of minorities, conventions regarding civil liberties, and status of women).
65. See RussELL, supra note 53 (discussing UNESCO's official purpose).
66. See UDHR, supra note 30 (citing preamble).
67. Richard Falk, Accountability, Asylum, and Sanctuary: Challenging Our Political and
Legal Imagination, in REFUGEE LAw AND PoUC. INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 34
(Ved P. Nanda, ed 1989).
68. UDHR, supra note 30 (quoting preamble).
69. See id. art. 3 (stating that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security
of person").
70. See id. art. 13(1) (stating that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of move-
ment and residence within the borders of each state"); see also id. art. 13(2) (stating that
"[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country").
71. See id. art. 14(1) ("Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other coun-
tries asylum from persecution").
72. See GooDwiN-GILL, supra note 31, at 173 (discussing principle that sovereign
states have exclusive control over those within its territory).
73. See id. at 173 n.8 (explaining that asylum is privilege granted by state, it is not
inherent individual right).
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b. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees
The 1951 Convention'74 was signed in Geneva on July 28,
1951. 75 This document expressly recognized the need to define
the legal status of refugees.76 Commentators note, however, that
the 1951 Convention refugee definition contained two substan-
tial shortcomings.77 The definition pertained only to those who
became refugees as a result of events that transpired prior to
January 1, 1951, and related only to those persons whose circum-
stances arose from events in Europe during World War 11.71 In
1967, the General Assembly79 corrected these flaws by adopting
the 1967 Protocol. 0 Experts note that the Protocol removed the
geographic and temporal restrictions on the refugee defini-
tion.81
Under both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, a
refugee is defined as one who has a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion. 2 Additionally,
74. 1951 Convention, supra note 33 (setting out humanitarian purpose of 1951
Convention).
75. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 38, at 20 (noting various committees that as-
sisted in 1951 Convention's preparations).
76. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 3, para. 5 (stating that "[s]oon after the
Second World War, as the refugee problem had not been solved, the need was felt for a
new international instrument to define the legal status of refugees ... there was a call
for an instrument containing a general definition of who was to be considered a refu-
gee").
77. See id. at 4, para 8 (recognizing that 1951 Convention needed to be expanded
to include new groups of refugees).
78. See id. at 4, para 9 (stating that states that acceded to 1967 Protocol agreed to
1951 Convention substantive provisions but without 1951 dateline).
79. See SHAw, supra note 16, at 828 (describing General Assembly as parliamentary
body of United Nations consisting of representatives from each member state).
80. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 35 (noting change in refugee populations since
1951 Convention's adoption).
81. See id. (stating that "it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all
refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 Janu-
ary 1951"); see also art. 1(3) (stating "[t]he present Protocol shall be applied by the
States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation...").
82. 1951 Convention, supra note 33, art. I(A). Article I(A) states:
(A) For purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to
any person who:
(2) owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
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the individual must be outside his or her country of nationality
and unable or, due to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or
herself of that country's protection. 3 Scholars note that, to a
large extent, this definition has endured, as many states have
adopted this refugee definition by statute.8 4 Although many
states have ratified these instruments, administrating the defini-
tion is left to the domestic law of specific states.8 5 Critics con-
tend that in addition, the 1951 Convention definition in many
cases is exceedingly limited.86 In response, there have been re-
gional attempts to broaden the scope of the 1951 Convention
definition. 7
c. Limitations
The 1951 Convention definition is narrowly construed to
ensure that states are not forced to concede their sovereignty, by
requiring them to accept refugees forced to leave their homes
because of generalized violence or war.8 8 Scholars note that sov-
ereign states have the freedom to interpret the 1951 Conven-
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is un-
able or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.
Id.
83. Id.
84. See Busby, supra note 46 (noting that U.S. domestic refugee law was modeled
after international refugee scheme); see also ANxER, supra note 33, at 10 (remarking that
Refugee Act of 1980 brought U.S. law in line with 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
85. See Falk, supra note 67, at 4-5 (discussing that states that have acceded to 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol must still take steps to incorporate provisions into their
domestic law). Therefore, although many states agreed to a single refugee definition,
each state may ultimately have varying definitions. Id.; DanielJ. Steinbock, Interpreting
the Refugee Definition, 45 U.C.LA. L. REv. 733, 734-35 (1998) (arguing that 1951 Conven-
tion refugee definition is one of most widely accepted refugee norms).
86. See Martin, et. aL, supra note 37, at 559 (discussing how 1951 Convention defi-
nition does not apply to those who are leaving unsettled conditions in their country of
origin and who may wish to return home when situation stabilizes); Steinbock, supra
note 85, at 738 (recognizing that 1951 Convention definition does not account for in-
creasing numbers of people who face hardships in their countries of origin).
87. See GOODWIN-GiLL, supra note 31, at 20 (addressing criticisms of 1951 Conven-
tion definition and some attempts at changing it).
88. See Helton &Jacobs, supra note 47, at 523 (outlining history of 1951 Conven-
tion, noting that states did not want to undermine their authority by creating over-
inclusive refugee definition).
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tion's terms.8 9 The U.N. Handbook (or "Handbook") offers
some guidance in this regard, noting that, for example, the per-
secution may arise from one of these stated reasons or from a
combination of reasons.90
Nevertheless, commentators note that many of today's refu-
gees do not fit the 1951 Convention definition in the traditional
sense.91 Many have fled en masse due to civil war or generalized
violence. 2 These individuals have not suffered individualized
persecution as required under the 1951 Convention. Experts
note that in times of civil war the legal question often becomes
whether the harmful action is perpetrated against a victim on
account of his or her race, religion, political opinion, or social
group membership, or on account of some other non-conven-
tion reason, such as generalized violence, economic hardship, or
civil war.94 Often, many victims of generalized violence appear
to qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention definition.95
One commentator noted that ethnic cleansing practices, for ex-
89. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 32 (noting that parties to 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol resolve refugee status under terms set out therein); see Falk, supra
note 67, at 4-5 (stating that refugee definitions differ from state to state).
90. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 17, para. 66 (stating that "[iln order to
be considered a refugee, a person must show well-founded fear of persecution for one
of the reasons states above. It is immaterial whether the persecution arises from any
single one of these reasons or from a combination of two or more of them").
91. SeeJAMEs HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 10 (1991) (discussing inter-
national broadening of refugee concept); see also Falk, supra note 67, at 5 (discussing
how refugee flows have changed so that many flee their country of origin because of
economic hardship or war).
92. See Falk, supra note 67, at 5 (asserting that refugee flows were once intermit-
tent but due to intense regional conflicts they are more prolonged today); see also Ar-
thur C. Helton, Forced International Migration: A Need for New Approaches by the Interna-
tional Community, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 1623, 1625 (1995) (arguing that current refu-
gee scheme is inadequate because it does not apply to internally displaced: those who
have been uprooted from their homes, but have not crossed international border).
93. See Helton, supra note 92, at 1625 (arguing that current protection is inade-
quate because it omits those who have fled because of war).
94. See Steinbock, supra note 85, at 737 (describing interpretative questions that
arise as result of vagaries of 1951 Convention definition, such as whether those who
violate laws of general applicability fall under one of recognized 1951 Convention
grounds); see also Helton & Jacobs, supra note 47, at 525 (recognizing fact that those
who have been displaced for reasons of armed conflict or civil war are not included
within definition).
95. See Kathleen Sarah Galbralth, Moving People: Forced Migration and International
Law, 13 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 597, 603 (1999) (noting that forced migration policies can
create 1951 Convention refugees if policies are implemented because of race, religion,
nationality, or membership of particular social group).
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ample, used by Balkan regimes in the last decade arguably allow
for a classic refugee classification of Bosnians and Albanians
forced from their countries of origin.96 Due to sheer numbers,
however, decisions on the status of these individuals have not
been based on the 1951 Convention definition, where each per-
son's application is assessed independently. 97 Instead, Balkan
refugees have been classified as a group and frequently only
granted temporary protection,98 not asylum.99
2. Regional Alternatives
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol do not protect
individuals who migrate across borders only because of war or
generalized violence, rather they protect those who face individ-
ualized persecution.100 Commentators note that many people in
need of protection fall outside the 1951 Convention defini-
tion. 101 Generally, Western states continue to rely on this con-
vention definition based on persecution,10 2 but other states have
supplemented the definition by adding other bases for refugee
96. Id.
97. See Simon Bagshaw, Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the
Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 INT'LJ. R UGEE L. 566, 567 (1997)
(citing U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees ("UNHCR7) statistics that in June 1996
there were approximately 1,319,250 Bosnian refugees in Europe; 170,000 in Croatia;
16,500 in Slovenia; and 6500 in Macedonia, all states of former Yugoslavia). Germany
held the largest Bosnian refugee population with 320,000. Id.
98. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 40, at 15 (discussing that temporary protection is
generally conferred on non-1951 Convention refugees); see also Bagshaw, supra note 97,
at 568 n.16 (quoting UNHCR report that premise behind temporary protection is to
afford immediate protection to broad groups of people). Temporary protection is in-
tended to assist 1951 Convention Refugees as well as those who are fleeing generalized
violence, and might not be considered 1951 Convention refugees. Bagshaw, supra. Eu-
ropean governments were concerned that the influx of refugees would create political
and economic instability in their countries. Id.
99. See Helton, supra note 92, at 1624 (defining asylum as state act that provides
protection to refugees by allowing entry into territorial jurisdiction).
100. See Helton &Jacobs, supra note 47, at 526 (discussing limits of 1951 Conven-
tion definition).
101. See Martin, et. al., supra note 37, at 559 (discussing 1951 Convention's limited
applicability); see also Helton supra note 92, at 1624, 1625 (noting 1951 Convention's
shortcomings).
102. See Nadia Yakoob, Report on the Workshop on Temporay Protection: Comparative
Policies and Practices, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 617, 618 (1999) (arguing that Western states,
as matter of law, have not afforded protection to civil war refugees, leaving mass migra-
tion responses up to individual states).
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status.113 Thus, for instance, the OAU1°4 Member States and
some Latin American governments, acknowledge the limitations
of the current, narrowly defined refugee definition, and have
broadened it in various ways.' 05 The 1969 OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
(or "OAU Convention"), contains an expanded definition of ref-
ugee to include individuals fleeing civil strife and public disor-
der."°6 A similarly broadened concept of the refugee character
is reflected in some Latin American practices based on the Car-
tagena Declaration. 107 This need for a broader refugee defini-
tion was recognized further in 1985 when the General Assembly
of the Organization of American States0 8 ("OAS") approved the
Cartagna Declaration refugee definition. 9
B. Mechanisms for Protection of Refugees
If an individual seeks refuge in another country, then that
individual generally has several options." 0 Typically, the options
include asylum or temporary protection, also called temporary
protected status ("TPS)."'1 In addition, the central principle of
103. See Steinbock, supra note 85, at 741 n.22 (discussing ways in which states have
organized to enhance refugee protection).
104. See Cort, supra note 37, at 316-17 (discussing that OAU Convention considers
those who have fled their homes because of generalized violence to be refugees).
105. See Cartagena Declaration, supra note 49 (discussing Cartagena Declaration's
expanded refugee definition).
106. See OAU Convention, supra note 37, art. 1(2) (setting forth bases for refugee
status, including "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seri-
ously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of country of origin or nation-
ality").
107. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 20-21 (explaining that Central American
conflicts in 1980s gave rise to Cartagena Declaration's broader understanding of refu-
gee concept).
108. See id. at 228 (defining Organization of American States ("OAS") as regional
organization devoted to protecting refugees).
109. Martin, et. al. supra note 37, at 559. See GOODwIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 21
n.92 (noting that OAS has repeatedly endorsed Cartagna Declaration).
110. See generally GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 230-31 (noting that general pro-
tection afforded refugees include non-refoulement, asylum, access to procedures for
determining refugee status, prevention of expulsion, discharge from detention, issue of
identity papers and travel documents, facilitation of voluntary repatriation, facilitation
of family reunion, access to educational institutions, benefit of other economic and
social rights, and facilitation of naturalization).
111. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 40, at 15-16 (defining state's schemes for temporary
protection as those that promote eventual repatriation of refugees rather than assist
them in becoming permanent citizens).
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non-refoulement12-the provision that guards refugees from
forcible return to a country where they are likely to become vic-
tims of persecution or torture"X3-- governs all refugee protection
regardless of classification under the 1951 Convention defini-
ton.11
4
1. Non-Refoulement
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention sets out the non-
refoulement principle."' The non-refoulement principle re-
quires contracting states to refrain from expelling or returning a
refugee to a country where his or her life or freedom would be
endangered on account of his or her race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." 6
Article 33 was drafted to complement Article I of the 1951 Con-
vention. 17
Commentators note that in practice, however, especially in
the case of a mass influx, non-refoulement applies equally to in-
dividual Convention refugees and to sizeable groups, who for
reasons of civil war, or other forms of mass dislocation, cannot
return to their homeland." 8 The U.N. High Commissioner for
112. See GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 38, at 6 (discussing non-refoulement protec-
tion as that which provides refugees with protection against forcible return to territory
where they face political persecution).
113. See id. at 46 (noting that non-refoulement requires that no refugee shall be
forced to return to state where they are likely to face political persecution).
114. See GOODWrN-GLL, supra note 31, at 137 (arguing that if asylum seeker is for-
cibly repatriated to country where he or she has well-founded fear of persecution or
fear of torture, then asylum seeker has been refouled contrary to international law).
Non-refoulement applies to all asylum seekers even if they are not legally classified as
refugees. Id.
115. See 1951 Convention, supra note 33, art. 33(I) (stating that "[n]o Contracting
State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the fron-
tiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion").
116. Id.
117. See GOODwIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 121 (discussing drafting history of provi-
sion). The 1951 Convention drafters designed the rule to apply only to those who had
a well-founded fear of persecution on basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.
118. See id. at 123 (recognizing that broader interpretation of non-refoulement has
evolved during past 45 years); see also David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle
of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Crue Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of
Other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 2 n.8 (1999)
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Refugees, 9 ("UNHCR") Executive Committee 120 has continu-
ally approved the essential principle of non-refoulement irre-
spective of whether the person fleeing his or her country of ori-
gin has been formally recognized as a refugee.' 2' Indeed, many
states have permitted refugees to cross their borders en masse,
and to remain pending an acceptable resolution. 22
Regional organizations, such as the OAU, and the Office of
the UNHCR, have applied the non-refoulement principle to per-
sons who fall outside the 1951 Convention definition of refu-
gee. 23 Additionally, Europe has extended the principle with the
concept of B-status 24 or defacto refugees.' 25 Asylum-seekers are
granted B-Status when they fail to meet the definition of refugee
under the 1951 Convention, but humanitarian considerations
make voluntary repatriation' 26 impossible.127
2. Asylum Protection
In international law, there is a clear distinction between the
(noting that only 19 of 185 U.N. Member States are not party to agreement that pro-
vides for non-refoulement protection).
119. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (visited on
Nov. 18, 1999) <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/hchr.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal) [hereinafter High Commissioner] (discussing function of
UNHCR to respond to serious human rights violations). The U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights monitors the activities of the UNHCR Office. Id.
120. See GOODWiN-GILL, supra note 31, at 215 (defining UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee as advisory body that assists U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights with
difficult refugee situations).
121. Id. at 127.
122. Id. at 123-24 (noting that states in Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia have
allowed refugees to stay indefinitely). Non-refoulement applies from the moment an
asylum seeker arrives in the receiving country. Id.
123. See Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement Run Afoul: The Questionable Legality of
Extraterritorial Repatriation Programs, 71 WASH U. L.Q. 833, 843-44 (1993) (arguing that
non-refoulement principle has been expanded by UNHCR and by regional agree-
ments).
124. See id. at 844 (discussing that B-status, also termed de facto status, may be
granted when person fails to meet 1951 Convention's refugee definition, but is still
protected against refoulement, and thus is allowed to remain because of obvious hu-
manitarian concerns that prevent repatriation).
125. Id.
126. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 270 (discussing that voluntary repatria-
tion occurs where refugee status ends and refugees can to return to his or her country
of origin because of improved political circumstances).
127. See Newmark, supra note 123, at 844 (stating that refugees are granted B-
status when humanitarian considerations preclude return to their country of origin).
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right of asylum and a grant of refugee status. 128 Asylum seekers
have no absolute right to be granted asylum.129 In the United
States and in Europe generally, two categories of refugees may
be granted asylum: those who fall under the 1951 Convention
definition, sometimes called de jure refugees,13 0 and those who
may be granted temporary or permanent asylum but without ref-
ugee status, or defacto refugees.' 3 ' This latter category is usually
protected against refoulement because of humanitarian reasons
that militate against returning them to their home country.
32
The UDHR states in Article 14(1) that everyone has the
right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution. 33 The UDHR
does not, however, define the parameters of this right.13 4 Thus,
it has been up to states to decide who may enjoy asylum protec-
tion within their borders. 3 5 Asylum is usually sought at the
point of entry into a country, when the individual has entered
illegally, or after the individual's legal status has expired. 3 6 One
scholar has noted that the asylum concept has three separate ele-
ments: the state's right to grant asylum; the individual's right to
seek asylum; and the individual's right to be granted asylum, a
concept not embraced by the international community.
37
A state's right to grant asylum flows from the accepted prin-
ciple that every sovereign state has exclusive control over its bor-
128. GOODwiN-GILL, supra note 31, at 34.
129. See HtLUNE LAMBERT, SEEKING AsyLuM: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACnCE IN
SELECTED EUROPEAN CouNTRIEs 4 (1995) (discussing that grants of asylum are privileges
rather than rights).
130. See id. at 126 (stating that dejure is another term for traditional 1951 Conven-
tion refugee).
131. See id. (stating that defacto refugee are refugees accepted for humanitarian
reasons).
132. Id
133. See UDHR, supra note 30, art. 14(1) (stating "[e]veryone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.").
134. See GOODWoN-GILL, supra note 31, at 175 (noting that during UDHR drafting
sessions, many states vehemently opposed proposal that United Nations would be em-
powered to secure asylum for refugees).
135. Id.
136. See Paul Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees: The Case of the Miss-
ing Shipload of Liberian Refugees, 35 STAN J. INT'L L. 313, 320 (1999) (discussing case of
Liberians who were unable to make immigration plans prior to fleeing because their
lives were in imminent danger).
137. See Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DusEJ.
INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 1 (1994) (arguing that these three rights are components of legal
right of asylum).
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ders and those who reside within them.13 8 The coronary to this
right is that sovereign nations have the right to grant and also to
deny asylum to persons located within their boundaries.13 9 Com-
mentators view the right of asylum as a right that vests in the
state and not as a right incumbent upon the individual. 140
None of the major human rights documents recognize a
right to be granted asylum. 4 ' In keeping with the UDHR right
for an individual to leave any country including his or her own,
international law permits individuals to leave their country of
residence and to pursue asylum.142 An individual's right to gain
asylum, however, is not an accepted principle in international
law.143 Furthermore, as one scholar has observed, large waves of
refugees have the potential to disrupt a receiving country. Gov-
ernments are also concerned that they cannot support large
numbers of refugees if they have to provide a permanent option
for all those who have crossed over into their territory. 44
3. Temporary Protected Status
Scholars note that refugee status is by its very nature tempo-
rary.'4 The notion of temporary protection, however, as op-
posed to asylum, which affords the refugee a permanent option,
is a relatively new development in refugee law.146  Although
138. See id. at 3 (arguing that this concept is firmly rooted in international law).
139. Id. at 3-4.
140. Id. at 4; see GOODWiN-GILL, supra note 31, at 176 (noting that states are sole
arbiters of grounds upon which they will confer asylum protection).
141. See Boed, supra note 137, at 10-11 (concluding that each of seminal post-
World War II human rights instruments clearly omits any mention of right to be
granted asylum).
142. See id. at 6 (discussing that foundation for this right is principle that states do
not own their citizens); A=a GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRrrORImA ASYLUM 2 (1980) (discussing
how right to seek asylum does not conflict with state sovereignty).
143. See Boed, supra note 137, at 9 (asserting that international law does not recog-
nize individual's right to be granted asylum).
144. See Kuruk, supra note 136, at 321 (discussing potential for serious disruption
faced by states that receive massive of refugees).
145. See Morten Kjaerum, Temporay Protection in Europe in the 1990s, 6 INT'LJ. REFU-
GEE L. 444, 445 (1994) (discussing that protection options are tied to origins of persecu-
tion). In theory, when persecution ends so does protection. Id. at 446.
146. See GOODWIN-GIL, supra note 31, at 196 (addressing main argument against
temporary refuge that would erode present practices on asylum and damage non-
refoulement principle). In the early 1980s, when U.N. representatives first began to
debate the notion of temporary protection, it was controversial, but today, temporary
protection is a recognized component of legal refugee schemes in many states. Id.; see
generally Kay Hailbronner, Comment, Temporary and Local Responses to Forced Migrations,
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there are compelling humanitarian reasons for states to provide
assistance to those in need, there is also a need for states to limit
full asylum protection, especially in the case of a large-scale in-
flux of people. 147 Commentators argue that the Convention def-
inition is adequate for individuals, but not for masses of people
seeking protection. 1
48
In fact, scholars have attributed the codification of TPS in
Western European law over the last decade to the European gov-
ernments' desire to avoid granting asylum status to the victims of
the Yugoslav wars, even though many of them could have quali-
fied for asylum as refugees. 49 During the Cold War, the 1951
Convention enjoyed public support and appeared adequate in
responding to the refugee crises in Western states.' 50 Often, the
media portrayed reasons for flight in manichean form: unre-
lenting Soviet bloc persecution versus the valiant refugee in pur-
suit of freedom.15  Today, in response to the thousands of asy-
lum seekers fleeing generalized violence, rather than individual-
ized persecution, some commentators view TPS as preferable to
asylum, so that they can be repatriated when the conflict ends.'
52
Currently, no standardized policy exists for the implementation
35 VA. J. INTr'L. L. 81, 90 (1994) (defining temporary protection as provisional right of
residence or tolerated status). Temporary protection is typically reviewed regularly and
renewed for an additional, limited period. Hailbronner, supra.
147. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 40, at 16 (commenting that whether refu-
gee entered country as part of mass influx of refugees, determines if she or he will be
offered asylum or Temporary Protected Status, ("TPS")).
148. See id. at 16. (remarking that traditional refugee law is no longer applicable to
mass influx situations). Although, there are different models for TPS in effect in vari-
ous parts of the world, this Note is concerned only with the practice of TPS relevant to
Europe and North America. See also GOODVIN-GILL, supra note 31, at 199 (distinguish-
ing European practice of temporary protection, that is explicitly premised on return to
country of origin, with Southeast Asian model of temporary refuge, which is premised
on resettling refugees to third countries).
149. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 40, at 18 (arguing that in some cases, latest at-
tempts to manage refugee flows reflect unwillingness to grant asylum to victims from
former Yugoslavia).
150. See id. at 28 (suggesting that Western governments and public viewed asylum
seeker, during Cold War era, more favorably than they do now).
151. See Exporting Misery, EcoNoMisr, Apr. 17, 1999 (suggesting that with end of
Cold War, although their numbers have grown, refugees have lost their symbolic value).
152. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 40, at 53 (claiming that human rights conditions in
refugee producing states are often unstable, therefore, in some circumstances repatri-
ating refugees is not option); see also Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Stan-
dards for Cessation of Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEo. ImMIGR.
LJ. 343 (1999) (arguing that repatriation may not be ideal solution)
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of TPS within a host state.15 3
Governments have invoked TPS when faced with a refugee
crisis, usually as a result of civil war.' 54  Scholars note that
although the purpose behind granting refugees TPS, instead of
asylum is eventually to facilitate repatriation, often repatriation
does not occur.'55 Thus, some scholars have discussed the prob-
lem of TPS as a backdoor to permanent residence because civil
conflict can last many years, which enables refugees to remain in
their host state for extended periods of time.'56
C. Conscientious Objectors
A conscientious objector is one who refuses to participate in
armed conflict, and bases his or her objection to military service
on religious, moral, ethical, humanitarian, or philosophical con-
victions.'5 7 In general, sovereign nations may call up their citi-
zens for active military duty, and evading the draft is not grounds
for obtaining asylum. 158 Compelling military service is ordinarily
153. See Yakoob, supra note 102, at 619-21 (noting that mechanisms employed by
states for granting temporary protection are largely discretionary and ad hoc).
154. See Martin, et. al., supra note 37, at 547 (noting that, for example, in United
States, TPS is invoked for several reasons including when there is abiding armed con-
flict and compelling return would endanger individual's lives).
155. See Yakoob, supra note 102, at 623 (discussing frequent criticism of temporary
protection that as practical matter those admitted to country under temporary protec-
tion often times never leave); see Fitzpatrick supra note 40, at 53 (arguing that states
view voluntary repatriation as ideal goal even though in certain war-torn regions, such
as Rwanda, it may be distant solution).
156. Yakoob, supra note 102, at 623; see Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing, 22
YALEJ. INT'L L. 243, 267 (1997) (discussing problems that arose from U.S. TPS grants to
El Salvadorians in 1980s). Few of the approximately 200,000 original TPS Salvadorans
will ever have to leave the United States. Schuck, supra. The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service cannot locate many of the original TPS Salvadorans, or how many remain
in the United States. Id. at 267. Once a refugee has been in a host country over a
lengthy period of time, he or she may develop strong ties to his or her community or
may bear children. Yakoob, supra note 102, at 623. For example, children of refugees
born in the United States will be U.S. citizens. Id.
157. See Musalo, supra note 42, at 850 n.9 (defining conscientious objector as one
who refuses to participate in armed conflict, and bases his or her objection to military
service on religious, moral, ethical, humanitarian, or philosophical convictions); see also
Lippman, supra note 42, at 31 (defining conscientious objection as refusal to partici-
pate in armed services based upon opposition to war); Wolff, supra note 42, at 68 (em-
phasizing that feelings of conscience should not be equated with religious motivations).
One does not have to base his or her objection to service on religious beliefs. Wolff,
supra; Major, supra note 42, at 350 (classifying conscience as ethical conviction that may
flow from either religious or humanist beliefs).
158. See U.N. HANDBOOY, supra note 33, para 167-74 (stating that although punish-
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considered to be well within the powers of a sovereign nation.159
Conscientious objection is not recognized as a human right,
although some scholars have maintained recently that in view of
several U.N. resolutions and the steady decrease in states that
have an active draft, the right to object may soon be considered
a human right.'6 ° Interpreting the right to freedom of thought,
religion, and conscience set out in the UDHR161 and in the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'6 2 ("ICCPR"),
the United Nations has expressly recognized a right of conscien-
ment for draft evasion varies among states, it does not normally constitute persecution).
An individual is not a refugee if his or her sole reason for draft evasion is that he or she
does not wish to serve, or is afraid to serve, in the military. Id.
159. Id. par. 167. The U.N. Handbook states that:
In countries where military service is compulsory, failure to perform this duty
is frequently punishable by law. Moreover, whether military service is compul-
sory or not, desertion is invariably considered a criminal offence. The penal-
ties may vary from country to country, and are not normally regarded as perse-
cution. Fear of prosecution and punishment for desertion or draft-evasion
does not in itself constitute well-founded fear of persecution ....
Id.; see also GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 38, at 231 (contending that conscription to ordi-
nary military service is not persecution under 1951 Convention definition).
160. See U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess, Supp. No. 5 at 108-109, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4 (1987)
(stating that "[a]nyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling
reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in war, shall have the right to be released
from the obligation to perform such service.. ."); Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59,
Draft Report of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/
L/10/Add. 15 (1989). This Report states that:
[R]ecognizing that conscientious objection to military service derives from
principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions arising
from religious, ethical, moral or similar motives .... recognizes the right of
everyone to have conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate
exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as laid
down in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as
article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Id.; see also Major, supra note 42, at 355-57 (citing to several human rights instruments
that recognize right to conscientious objection); Emily N. Marcus, Conscientious Objection
as an Emerging Human Right, 38 VA.J. INT'L. L. 507, 509 (1998) (reviewing definitions of
conscientious objection and proposing that conscientious objection is emerging human
right in international law).
161. See UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 18 (stating that "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and obser-
vance").
162. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
on Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 art. 18(2), with reservation in 999 U.N.T.S. 287
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating that "[n]o one shall be
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice").
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tious objection as a legitimate expression of these three rights. 163
Scholars discuss two categories of conscientious objectors:
absolute conscientious objectors, 6 those who oppose all war,
and selective conscientious objectors, 65 those who, as in the case
of many civil wars, oppose a specific conflict. 66 The latter group
presents complicated legal issues in international law.'
67
1. Absolute Conscientious Objection
Absolute conscientious objection occurs when an objector
refuses to serve in the military.16  Although conscientious objec-
tion is not recognized as a human right, the U.N. Handbook
discusses draft evasion as a recognized basis for asylum.' 69 Con-
scientious objection as an exception to the rule that states have
the power to call up citizens for active duty has international sup-
port.' 70 The U.N. Handbook recommends that states grant refu-
gee status to persons who resist the draft for genuine reasons of
conscience. 17  An objector may object on the basis of religious
163. See Marcus, supra note 160, at 516 (stating that in view of these provisions,
rights of freedom of thought, religion, and conscience are assured).
164. See Kevin J. Kuzas, Note, Asylum for Conscientious Objectors to Military Service: Is
There a Right Not To Fight?, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 447, 449 (1991) (defining absolute consci-
entious objector as true pacifist).
165. See id. at 449-50 (defining selective conscientious objector as one who refuses
to participate in particular military engagement).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 458-60 (explaining that U.S. Vietnam War draft evaders, who dis-
agreed with U.S. military policy, sought asylum in Canada, Netherlands, and Sweden).
Although sympathetic to the draft evaders, these states did not grant them asylum
under the 1967 Protocol. Id. at 459. Instead, they were granted residence permits,
which provided significantly less protection than complete asylum. Id. Sweden's and
Canada's immigration measures caused diplomatic tension with the United States. Id.
168. See id. at 449-50 (referring to absolute conscientious objector as devout pad-
fist, one who for reasons of conscience refuses to engage in military combat).
169. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33 (discussing conscientious objection to mili-
tary service in relation to refugee status).
170. See GooDwrN-GiLL, supra note 31 (arguing that there is considerable interna-
tional support for right of conscientious objection); see Major, supra note 42, at 352
(explaining that many states recognize absolute conscientious objection claims, but do
not recognize selective objection claims).
171. See U.N. HAUDBOOK, supra note 33, para. 173. The U.N. Handbook states:
The question as to whether objection to performing military service for rea-
sons of conscience can give rise to a valid claim to refugee status should also
be considered in the light of more recent developments in this field. An in-
creasing number of States have introduced legislation or administrative regu-
lations whereby persons who can invoke genuine reasons of conscience are
exempted from military service either entirely or subject to their performing
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beliefs or moral conviction. 172 Thus, if one is generally opposed
to war, he has a valid basis to object, to be classified as a refugee,
and to obtain asylum. 173
2. Selective Conscientious Objection
Unlike the absolute conscientious objector definition, the
selective conscientious objector definition has considerably less
international legal support.174 The UDHR states that every per-
son has the right to seek and to enjoy in other states asylum from
persecution.175 In keeping with the spirit of this principle, the
U.N. Handbook sets out guidelines for selective military service
exemptions. 7 6  The Handbook reflects the skepticism with
which selective claims are regarded, stating that not all convic-
tions, no matter how valid or deeply held, constitute a sufficient
reason for requesting refugee status after a desertion or an eva-
sion. 17  The first exemption applies when the deserter or draft
evader suffers disproportionately severe punishment for the mili-
tary offense on account of race, religion, nationality, political
alternative (i.e. civilian) service .... In the light of these developments, it
would be open to Contracting States, to grant refugee status to persons who
object to performing military service for genuine reasons of conscience.
172. See Wolff, supra note 42, at 69 (asserting that conscientious objection can be
motivated by feeling of conscience or by belief in God).
173. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, para 170. The U.N. Handbook states that
There are, however, also cases where the necessity to perform military service
may be the sole ground for a claim to refugee status, i.e., when a person can
show that the performance of military service would have required his partici-
pation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral
convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.
Id.
174. See Major, supra note 42, at 353 (arguing that one reason why right to selec-
tive objection does not have much international support is because if one objects to
particular war, he or she is implying that state is acting illegally or wrongfully). The
inference here is that if a state recognized the selective objector then the state would
indirectly recognize the illegality of its own war. Id.; see also Lippman, supra note 42, at
33 (recognizing fact that it is difficult to ascertain genuineness of one's beliefs).
175. See UDHt, supra note 30, art. 14 (stating that "[elveryone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.")
176. See Marcus, supra note 160, at 537 (stating that mere political opposition to
specific military activity, although genuinely held, is not enough to gain refugee status).
177. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, para 171 (stating that "[n]ot every convic-
tion, genuine though it may be, will constitute a sufficient reason for claiming refugee
status after desertion or draft-evasion. It is not enough for a person to be in disagree-
ment with his government regarding the political justification for a particular military
action.").
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opinion, or membership in a particular social group.178 The sec-
ond exemption applies if the international community has
deemed the particular military action that an individual refuses
to participate in as contrary to basic standards of human activ-
ity.'79 Punishing objectors in these situations could be regarded
as persecution according to the Handbook guidelines.18 0 More
recently, the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights passed
resolutions in 1989, 1993, and 1995 stating that the right of con-
scientious objection to military service is an extension of the
rights set out in the UDHR and ICCPR.1
8 1
D. The Balkan Conflict
In the 1980s, afterJosip Broz182 ("Tito"), the Secretary Gen-
eral of Yugoslavia died, nationalism reemerged as a destabilizing
political force. 83 Beginning in 1991, civil war consumed Yugo-
slavia,'84 which gradually disunited into five states."8 5 Authorities
178. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, para. 169. The Handbook states:
A deserter or draft-evader may also be considered a refugee if it can be shown
that he would suffer disproportionately severe punishment for the military of-
fence on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political social group or political opinion. The same would
apply if it can be shown that he has well-founded fear of persecution on these
grounds above and beyond the punishment for desertion.
Id.
179. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 33, para 170. The U.N. Handbook states:
There are, however, also cases where the necessity to perform military service
may be the sole grounds for a claim to refugee status, i.e., when a person can
show that the performance of military service would have required his partici-
pation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral
conviction, or to valid reasons of conscience.
Id.
180. Id.
181. Marcus, supra note 160, at 516; see Conscientious Objection to Military Service,
Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Session., 55th mtg. at P1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/(1989); Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1993/
84 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., 67th mtg. at P1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/(1993); Conscientious
Objection to Military Service, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1995/83, U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., 62d
mtg. at P1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/(1995).
182. See DAVID OWEN, BAuKAN ODYSSEY 7 (1995) (explaining Josip Broz, better
known as Tito, was General Secretary of Yugoslavia for 35 years, until he died in 1980).
183. See id. at 10 (discussing how Yugoslav population never forgot completely re-
gional nationalisms of past under Tito's regime).
184. See CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKup OF YuGOsLAviA AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA 12
(1998) (stating that Communists established Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in
November 1945). The Yugoslavia extant from 1945 to 1991 consisted of six republics,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Id. Addi-
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comment that after Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in
1980s, 186 the climate of hostility among Kosovar Albanians and
Serbians worsened. 8 7 In March 1999, NATO intervened with
military force on behalf of Kosovar Albanians in an effort to
thwart the population displacement, ethnic cleansing, and atroc-
ities the Serbian government committed.' 8 In addition to those
fleeing the civil war in Kosovo, many Serbians who objected to
their government's actions in Kosovo evaded the draft. 8 9 Many
fled Yugoslavia to Hungary and are now living as refugees. 9 °
1. History
Historians have argued that Yugoslavia's demise was predict-
able after Tito death in 1980.191 After 1980, tensions flared
throughout the country and nationalism emerged as a political
force. 19 2 Gradually the Bosnians, Croats, the Macedonians, and
tionally Kosovo and Vojvodina, were autonomous entities within Serbia. Id. See generally
ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS (1995) (detailing general history of region); RE-
BECCA WEST, BLACK LAm AND GREY FALCON (1944) (accounting her travels through
Yugoslavia in 1930s).
185. SeeJohn F. Burns, Confirming Split, Last 2 Republics Proclaim a Small New Yugo-
slavia, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 28, 1992, at Al (reporting that on April 27, 1992, Serbia and
Montenegro announced establishment of new Yugoslavia). The other four breakaway
states were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Id.
186. See generally ROGEL, supra note 184, at 22-25 (outlining former Yugoslavia's
descent into civil war). President Milosevic was elected President of Serbia in 1990 on a
nationalist platform. Id. at 22. He also appealed those who feared the introduction of
a market economy and economic instability. Id.
187. See MiRANDA VICKERs, BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANiAN: A HISTORY OF Kosovo
227 (1998) (recounting how Milosevic capitalized on incipient Serbian nationalism); see
alsoJULIE A. MERTUS, Kosovo: How MyTs AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR 7 (1999) (argu-
ing that events during 1980s produced Kosovo myth about Serbian victimization in
need of strong pro-Serbian leader).
188. See Guy Dinmore, Serbians Leave Sites of Civilian Slayings; Initial Probe Reveals
Pattern of Atrocities, WASH. PoST, Oct. 1, 1998, at A32 (stating that over 700 people were
killed between February 1998 and October 1998).
189. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2 (outlining Serbian conscientious objector
predicament); see also Mistiaen, supra note 14 (discussing conscientious objectors' rea-
sons for flight from Serbia).
190. Amnesty Report, supra note 2.
191. See ROGEL, supra note 184, at 16 (arguing that Tito kept Yugoslavia unified).
192. See MERTUS, supra note 187, at 8 (reasoning that in time of political and eco-
nomic instability, especially after communism's demise, politics of Serbian victimization
caught on rapidly). The Serbian media encouraged stereotyping of Albanians. Id. The
media characterized Albanian men as rapists, despite the fact that Kosovo had the low-
est reported cases of sexual assault in Yugoslavia. Id. Similarly, the media depicted
Albanian women as bearing too many children although the birth rates of urban Ko-
sovo Albanian women were nearly the same as urban Serbian women. Id.
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the Slovenes would break away from Yugoslavia.' 3
Kosovo, 194 an autonomous republic within Serbia, has lob-
bied for independence from Serbia for many years. 5 Although
Kosovo is comprised mainly of Albanians, Serbians view the re-
gion as a core of Serbian culture dating back to the Middle
Ages.' 96 Throughout the 1980s, human rights groups charged
that Serbian police were oppressing Kosovo Albanians. 9 7 At the
same time, Serbians accused Albanians of targeting Serbians for
violence. 9 Notably, Slobodan Milosevic,199 then a midlevel
communist bureaucrat, exploited the tense situation in Kosovo
to further his political career, particularly in a now infamous
1987 speech in which he reminded crowds of the historic impor-
tance of the province. °° Many view this incendiary sermon as a
193. Michael T. Kaufman, A Dfferent Kind of War in Kosovo: Serbian Repression vs.
Quiet Resistance, N.Y. T mEs, June 23, 1992, at Al.
194. See Steve Kinzer, Ethnic Conflict Is Threatening in Yet Another Region of Yugosla-
via: Kosovo, N.Y. TIM s, Nov. 9, 1992, at Al (reporting on region's ethnic tensions).
Kosovo, is an autonomous region inside Serbia. Id. More than 90% of the population
is Albanian Muslim. Id. Serbians are a distinct minority. Id. Kosovo is the former
Yugoslavia's poorest region. Id. It is mostly agrarian and undeveloped. Id.
195. See id. at Al (noting that Yugoslav Constitution granted Kosovo wide auton-
omy). The post-Tito Government revoked Kosovo's autonomy and Serbia reabsorbed
the region. Id.; see generally MALcouM, supra note 3, at 343-45 (discussing Serbian gov-
ernment's revocation of Kosovo's autonomy).
196. See MALcoLM, supra note 3, at xxviii (noting that Serbian nationalists consist-
ently employ religious rhetoric as reason for historical claim to region).
197. See MERTus, supra note 187, at 6-7 (discussing pattern of human rights viola-
tions in region). The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Former Yugo-
slavia reported of Serbian police brutality against Kosovo Albanians throughout the
1990s. Id.
198. See id. at 9 (suggesting that many Serbians believed they were targets of mili-
tant Albanian groups).
199. See generally DUSKO DODER & LOUISE BRANSON, MILOSEVIc: PORTRAIT OF A Ty-
RANT (1999) (describing Slobodan Milosevic as former Communist party leader who
became president of Yugoslavia in 1990); see Yugoslavia, Background: A Crisis Waiting To
Happen, Report EUR 70/32/98 (visited on Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.amnesty.org/
ailib/aipub/1998> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting that
prior to his election in 1990, Milosevic was president of League of Communists in Ser-
bia, party in power, in late 1980s).
200. See MALcoLM, supra note 3, at 341 (discussing events that led up to President
Milosevic's speech on April 24, 1987 in which he shouted to crowd of Serbians in Ko-
sovo town Kosovo Polje, "No one should dare beat you!"). This speech and these words
marked a turning point in Milosevic's political career. Id. This speech was played over
and over again on Radio Television Belgrade. Id. at 342. See generally DODER & BRAN-
SON, supra note 199, at 3 (examining nationalist impact of this speech); VcICKERS, supra
note 187, at 228 (noting how Milosevic used this speaking opportunity to remind
crowds of their Serbian ancestral ties to Kosovo).
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flash point for an aggressive surge in Serbian ethnic pride and
nationalism. 20 1
On June 25, 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared indepen-
dence from Yugoslavia.20 2 Two days later, on June 27, a ten-day
war between Serbia and Slovenia commenced. 0 3 It ended with
minimal casualties on July 7, 1991.204 The war between Croatia
and Serbia continued through late November, causing 10,000
casualties and approximately 730,000 refugees to flee to neigh-
boring republics. 05 In 1992, the European Community ("EC")
recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia as in-
dependent states.20 6 In 1993, the EC recognized Macedonia.20 7
The remainder of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montene-
gro, including the Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces, became the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY').208
On January 9, 1992, slightly less than one week after the
cease-fire in Croatia became effective, the Bosnian Serbian pop-
ulation of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence.20 9 War
began in the spring of 1992 and lasted until 1995.210 After failed
attempts at diplomacy, NATO conducted aerial strikes against
Bosnian Serbians between 1993 and 1995.211 In 1995, the Day-
ton Peace Accords212 effectively ended the fighting in 1995 by
recognizing the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a two-part
201. See MALcoLM, supra note 3, at 342 (arguing that after speech, Milosevic in-
creased his use of anti-Albanian slogans and rhetoric); see also MERTuS, supra note 187,
at 179 (proposing that this speech was turning point in Serbia's national awakening).
202. WARREN ZIMMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE 140 (1996).
203. I&
204. Id at 144.
205. ROGEL, supra note 184, at 26.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 27
209. SABRINA PmmA RAmE, BALKAN BABEL 205 (1999).
210. See id. at 239 (estimating that some 215,000 persons died in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina and approximately 2.7 million people became refugees). It is estimated that Bos-
nian soldiers raped approximately 20,000 to 50,000 Bosnian Muslim women. Id. at 239.
211. See id. at 232 (discussing NATO's ambivalence about involvement in civil war);
see also ROGEL, supra note 184, at 35 (noting that in 1994 NATO shot down four Serbian
planes in defense of U.N. personnel); RictRAR HOLBROOKE, To EzN WAR 101 (1998)
(describing that NATO planes attacked Bosnian Serbian stations around Sarajevo on
August 30, 1995). At that time, it was the largest military action in NATO's history.
HourRooKE, supra, at 102.
212. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 202, at 232-33 (discussing agreement reached in
1995, effectively ending Bosnian war). The agreement granted Serbians 49% of Bosnia,
and their own republic within Bosnia called Republicka Srpska. Id.
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state, a Muslim-Croat federation and a Serbian Republic.2 13 In
the final peace agreement, however, Kosovo was not men-
tioned.2 4
2. Kosovo Crisis
Kosovo was a region of unrest years before President
Milosevic's rise to power in Serbia. 1 Commentators argue that
each side in this ferocious ethnic divide2 1 6 has used history as
their palimpsest, upon which pasts are glorified,21 enemies are
demonized, and truths are obfuscated .2 1  During the commu-
nist era, however, Albanian Kosovars enjoyed modest cultural
prosperity.2 19 The Yugoslav government opened schools for Al-
banians, and Kosovo was granted autonomous status as a region
213. Id.
214. See MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 353 (asserting that peaceful resistance efforts in
Kosovo prior to Dayton Peace Accords continued to be passive because much of popula-
tion believed that Kosovo would be included in war-ending settlement). Instead, Presi-
dent Milosevic remained in power and his policies in Kosovo were not included in the
peace agreement. Id. The Dayton Peace Accords sanctioned Serbia in one respect,
they would not be allowed access to the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") until they
improved their human rights record with Kosovo Albanians. Id. Kosovo's omission
from Dayton Peace Accords had one significant effect: the population grew less in-
clined to accept passive resistance policies. Id.
215. See Kinzer, supra note 194 (predicting, in 1992, major conflagration in Ko-
sovo); see also Kaufman, supra note 193 (reporting on depth of animosity between Al-
banians and Serbians).
216. See Europe's Roughest Neighbourhood, supra note 24, at 3 (reporting on war-torn
history of Balkans). The Serbians had laid claim to an empire that included most of
Greece until the Turks defeated them on June 28, 1389. Id.; Chris Hedges, JournaL: If
the Walls Could Speak, Serb Epic Would Unfold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at A3 (noting
that sacred component to Serbian ties to Kosovo date even farther back than 1389);
PETER R. PRIFTI, CONFRONTATION IN Kosovo: THE ALBANIAN-SERB STRUGGLE, 1969-1999
34 (1999) (noting that in 1346, Pec, Kosovo, Serbian Orthodox Church officially be-
came independent of Constantinople). Throughout the middle ages Serbian religious
life flourished in the region. PRIFrI, supra.
217. See Hedges, supra note 216 (discussing how 1389 battle is routinely invoked as
beginning of episodic Serbian oppression and Ottoman domination that endured until
First Balkan War of 1912). Today, the battle is routinely appealed to in songs and in
epic poems. Id.; see also MALcoLM, supra note 3, at xxx (arguing that 19th century
Serbian nationalist ideology concocted cult of medieval battle of Kosovo).
218. See Jane Perlez, Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo Has Centuries-Old Roots, N.Y. TiMEs,
May 5, 1999, at, A13 (reporting that many Serbians argue that Kosovo was wasteland
until Serbian settlement in region around sixth and seventh centuries, and that Albani-
ans only arrived, along with vanquishing Turks circa 15th century). Alternatively,
Kosovar history chronicles past where Albanians descended from ancient lllyrians, who
were original inhabitants in the region. Id.
219. See id. (noting that Kosovars enjoyed some cultural prosperity after Tito
granted Kosovo autonomous status in 1974).
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within the Republic of Serbia, and this status was later elevated
to autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia.220 When
Milosevic rose to power in the late 1980s the Serbian govern-
ment revoked Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, and reversed many of
the earlier advances in Kosovo.
22 1
In response to the loss of autonomy and attendant rights
and privileges, a political party, the Democratic League of Ko-
sovo 222 ("LDK"), led by Ibrahim Rugova, emerged in Kosovo.
223
Commentators note that at first, the Kosovo Albanian resistance
was largely peaceful.224 Various activists pressed the West to re-
tain sanctions against Serbia until Serbia resolved the human
rights situation.225 Rugova urged peaceful resistance and pa-
tience in the face of Serbian policies.226 Also, he expressed con-
fidence that when the Bosnian crisis ended, the situation in Ko-
sovo would be included in the resolution.227 The Dayton Peace
Accords, however, made no substantive mention of a plan to ad-
dress Kosovo.228
Gradually, Kosovo Albanians stopped accepting passive
220. RAMEx, supra note 209, at 304.
221. See MALcor-i, supra note 3, at 344 (noting that when Kosovo was stripped of
its autonomy, rioting broke out in Pristina); RAMr, supra note 209, at 308 (noting that
Albanian language education was terminated, and Albanians were fired from theirjobs
and replaced by Serbians). Police brutality against Albanians increased and the Bel-
grade government confiscated land from Albanians and redistributed it to Serbians.
RAMT, supra.
222. See MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 347-48 (describing that Democratic League of
Kosovo ("LDK7) evolved in 1980s).
223. Id at 348.
224. See VicKERs, supra note 187, at 242 (discussing that in 1990 many Albanians
discarded violent resistance to Serbian domination and officially embarked on cam-
paign of passive resistance, led by Adem Demaci); see also GREG CAMPBELL, TI-E RoAD TO
Kosovo, A BAL.K AN DraR, 153 (1999) (mentioning emphasis Kosovo leaders placed on
passive resistance during early 1990s).
225. Perlez, supra note 218, at A13. See MALcoLM, supra note 3, at 348 (noting that
LDK's mission was three-tiered). First, to prevent violence. MALCOLM, supra. Second,
to seek the help of international organizations and the United Nations to raise aware-
ness of Serbian oppressive policies. Id. Third, to ignore the legitimacy of Serbian rule
by boycotting elections and setting up Albanian run schools and institutions. Id.
226. MALcou, supra note 3, at 353.
227. See CAMPBELL, supra note 224, at 153 (discussing how Albanian passive resist-
ance advocates impressed upon population that any international resolution to Bosnian
war would include resolution to fighting in Kosovo); see also VcKERs, supra note 187, at
265 (contending that Kosovo's leaders embraced passive resistance because they feared
war with Serbia).
228. See RAlA, supra note 209, at 310 (discussing omission of Kosovo from Dayton
Accords).
1478 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURVAL [Vol.23:1448
resistance policies, and the Kosovo Liberation Army 229 ("KLA"),
a terrorist organization, gained a large following.230 During
1998, Serbian forces in Kosovo launched a series of attacks in the
region.23 ' At approximately the same period, KLA members
targeted Serbians for violence.232
The numbers of Albanian refugees increased during 1998
along with reports of Serbian aggression and violence towards
Albanians. 33 By January 1999, Serbian troops forced some
20,000 Albanian civilians from their homes. 2 4 On January 15,
1999, forty-five Albanians were murdered in Racak, a Kosovar
town.2 5 From December 1998 to March 1999, the refugee toll
reached 80,000.26
3. Serbian Atrocities
Kosovo Albanians suffered sporadic episodes of violence by
Serbian police and military until March 1998.37 In March 1998,
however, Serbian forces launched a series of attacks against civil-
ians.8 Commentators note that these attacks marked a turning
point in relations among Kosovo and Serbia and NATO. As a
229. See VicKzRs, supra note 187, at 290 (remarking that after Dayton Accords ne-
glected to mention Kosovo, many grew to reject passive resistance policies). In re-
sponse to this increasing hostility, in 1996 an underground organization called the Ko-
sovo Liberation Army ("KLA") initiated a series of attacks against Serbians. Id. at 291.
The organization appeared to receive its funding, weapons, and training from Kosovars
living in Western Europe and sources in the Middle East. Id.
230. See id. at 309 (noting that KLA grew in numbers from reportedly only 100 or
so before 1997 to several thousand by middle of 1998); see also Chris Hedges, Victims Not
Quite Innocent, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1999, at 1 (asserting that although KLA atrocities
are not equal to Serbian crimes, KLA shows little compassion for its ethnic rivals and
has reportedly targeted Serbians for kidnappings and executions).
231. RA~mF, supra note, 209, at 309.
232. Id
233. See id. at 310 (estimating that by mid-September 1998, approximately 265,000
Albanians were homeless).
234. See Id. at 317 (noting that by end ofJanuary 1999, there were approximately
200,000 displaced Kosovar refugees).
235. Id.
236. Id at 317-18.
237. See Serbs Pound Kosovo To Repel Separatists, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at Al (re-
porting that Serbian police launched attacks against Albanian Kosovar civilians). The
Serbian military allegedly attacked in retaliation for Albanian killings of four Serbian
policemen. Id.
238. See Defiant Albanians Rebury Their Dead in Kosovo Province, Cm. TIaB., Mar. 11,
1998, at 1 (discussing repeated Serbian military attacks on villages Serb government
believed to have sheltered KLA members).
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direct result of these Serbian attacks, ethnic Albanian refugees
fled Kosovo for neighboring Albania.239 Serbian forces killed
hundreds of Kosovo Albanians. 4 ° Western observers were un-
sure of the extent of the atrocities until Serbian forces temporar-
ily pulled out of the region in September 1998.241 Throughout
1998, journalists reported of Serbian massacres in the region. 4 2
These reports renewed NATO discussions of a military interven-
tion.243
When the 1999 NATO bombings began, Serbian forces in-
tensified their attacks against Kosovo Albanians.2" Some argue
that the Serbian government planned the mass killings to coin-
cide with the beginning of Operation Allied Force.245 After the
cease-fire, humanitarian workers and war crimes investigators
unearthed mass civilian graves.
246
239. See Serbs Keep Shelling Kosovo Villages Despite Threat of Sanctions, N.Y. TuMES, June
7, 1998, at 8 (noting that in one week, over 10,000 ethnic Albanian refugees fled Kosovo
due to fighting).
240. See id. (estimating that over 250 people died from March 1, 1998 to June 7,
1998).
241. See Dinmore, supra note 188 (reporting that Western investigators gathered
evidence of genocide after Serbian troops left region).
242. See id. (listing systemic Serbian human rights abuses against ethnic Albani-
ans). Serbian police attacked villages, rounded up civilians, separated the men from
the women and children, beat them and gouged their eyes with pitchforks. Id.; see also
Philip Smucker, Kosovo Refugees Easy Preyfor Serbian Forces, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 11, 1998,
at A30 (reporting on how Kosovar refugees, herded into camps, were easy targets for
Serbian forces). Serbian troops torched Villages surrounding Pec, a village near Pris-
tina, Kosovo's capital. Smucker, supra.
243. See Serbian Deception, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 6, 1998, at A22 (arguing that NATO
should intervene and end humanitarian crisis).
244. See John Daniszewski, Evidence Details Systematic Plan of Killings on Kosovo; As
More Graves Are Discovered Daily, LA. TiMEs, Aug. 8, 1999, atAl (estimating that 1 out of
every 180 Kosovo Albanians died during 11 week bombing campaign).
245. See id. (discussing that extent of civilian killings was too vast to have been
result of Serbian reaction to wartime attack). A German foreign policy advisor, ob-
tained a document that detailed plans for systemic Kosovo Albanian murders. Id. Ser-
bian massacres began less than a day after Operation Allied Force commenced. Id. In
the Southern region of Kosovo, Serbian troops killed 3000 civilians during the first
week of the bombing. Id.
246. See Maggie Farley, 2,108 Corpses Dug Up so Far in Kosovo Effort, LA. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1999, atA12 (discussing that teams of investigators discovered grave sites containing
more than 50 corpses); see also Philip Shenon, State Dept. Now Estimates Serbian Drive
Killed 10,000, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 10, 1999, at A12 (noting difficulty in determining death
toll because Serbians made concentrated effort to destroy evidence of killings). Serbian
troops burned bodies to prevent identification. Shenon, supra. Serbian military forces
and police also systematically raped Kosovo Albanian women. Id.
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4. NATO Intervention
On March 25, 1999, NATO 247 launched air attacks on Ko-
sovo, Montenegro, and Serbia .2  From March 25 to June 9,
NATO unleashed 12,575 air strikes, forcing Yugoslavia to agree
to a ceasefire.2 49 In the end, the fighting displaced 600,000 civil-
ians within Kosovo, and forced 800,000 out of the country.25 °
After the seventy-eight day bombing campaign, President
Milosevic capitulated to international demands and agreed to a
cease-fire. 25 1  The U.N. Security Council 252 voted to deploy
247. See SHAw, supra note 16 (stating that NATO was founded in 1949 as military
alliance to defend against eastern bloc states whereby each country agreed to consult if
another member was threatened with force). Id.; see also Sergio Balanzino, NATO's Ac-
tions To Uphold Human Rights and Democratic Values in Kosovo: A Test Case for a New Alli-
ance, 23 FoRDHAM INr'L L.J. 364, 364 (1999) (observing irony that NATO's 50th Anni-
versary fell during war in Kosovo); see generally Francis Y_ Clines, At NATO'S Birthday
Party, Chilling Specter of Kosovo, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1999, at A3 (reporting on NATO's
50th anniversary celebration); Tim Weiner NATO Finds Kosovo War Is a Fly in Its Cham-
pagne, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1999, at Al (commenting that delegates from 42 nations
gathered to honor NATO's golden anniversary); see Alan Cowell, It's a Wonder This Alli-
ance Is Unified, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1999, at 5 (noting that currently, NATO is com-
prised of 19 members). The 19 members are Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. Cowell, supra.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland acceded to the Alliance in March 1999. Id.;
seeJane Perlez, NATO Confronts aNewRole: RegionalPoliceman, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999,
at A4 (stating that NATO launched Operation Allied Force almost one year after Ko-
sovo's internal armed conflict and about six months after NATO first threatened to use
force); see Balanzino, supra, at 365 (asserting that some commentators have regarded
NATO's involvement as exceptional because, this was first time alliance, established as
mutual defense treaty, deployed sustained military power outside its borders to avert
humanitarian tragedy); see also Perlez, supra (noting that although there was support
among member nations, 70% of arms used in air strikes were from United States);
Knights in Shining Armour? NATO's 50th Birthday This Weekend Was To Be a Time for Con-
gratulatory Back-patting. Instead, There Will Be Soul-searching, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999
(reporting that although United States provided most of strategic bombers, British,
France, and German governments provided substantial amount of military equipment).
248. RAMET, supra note 209, at 320
249. Balanzino, supra note 247, at 372.
250. See Messy War, Messy Peace, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1999 (arguing that death toll
and refugee numbers militate against suggestion that NATO was victorious).
251. See Balanzino, supra note 247, at 372 (noting that eventually President
Milosevic surrendered to NATO's five demands). Milosevic agreed to a cessation of all
military action and to the killings; the withdrawal of Serbian military, police, and
paramilitary forces; an international military presence in Kosovo; full refugee repatria-
tion to Kosovo; the establishment of a political framework for Kosovo based on the
Rambouillet Accords. Id.
252. See SHAw, supra note 16, at 825-26 (defining U.N. Security Council as body
comprised of five permanent member nations and 10 rotating member nations and
2000] SERBIAN CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 1481
peacekeeping forces to the area. President Milosovic signed
an agreement allowing for Kosovo to remain within Yugoslavia,
but it was to have a severely truncated interaction with Serbia.25 4
The approved plan established an autonomous Kosovo with a
parliament, judiciary, local government, and police force.255
The Kosovars would have minimal contact with Yugoslavia, but
they would not serve in the military or pay taxes, to ensure that
they could achieve gradual independence from the central gov-
ernment within three years.256
Part of the cease-fire between Serbia and NATO involved
the return of refugees to KoSoVo. 25 7 Commentators note that
initially, the refugee crisis rallied public support in the West
around the bombing campaign. 25 8 As the swells of deracinated
Kosovars threatened to further destabilize the Balkan region,
Western governments brainstormed to devise a plan to cope with
the refugees. 259 Because neighboring Western European coun-
tries were already weary from waves of Bosnian refugees, 260 the
created by Article 27 of U.N. Charter to have primary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security).
253. Craig R. Whitney, Bombing Ends as Serbs Begin Pullout, N.Y. Tims June 11,
1999, at Al; seeJane Perlez, NATO Expects Separate Kosovo Without Yugoslav Police or Taxes,
N.Y. TiMES, June 11, 1999, at Al. (discussing various plans for post-war Kosovo).
254. See Perlez, supra note 253 (reporting that NATO officials plan for Kosovo to
be part of Yugoslavia in theory only). Eventually Kosovo will be an independent state.
Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. (noting that West Europeans are concerned about possibility that
breakaway Kosovo might encourage other separatist groups in Europe to wage war for
independence).
257. See Balanzino, supra note 247, at 372 (discussing right of refugees to return to
Kosovo as part of NATO cease-fire agreement).
258. See Exporting Misery, supra note 151 (criticizing efficacy of Operation Allied
Force because it had unintended consequence of provoking refugee crisis); see also Vic-
tim ofSerbia-or NATO?, ECONom'sT, Apr. 3, 1999 (suggesting that NATO's intervention
provoked genocide instead of thwarting it). After four days of bombing, 500,000
Kosovars, over one fourth of the population, were driven out of their homes. Victim Of
Serbia, supra.
259. See Exporting Misery, supra note 151 (detailing Kosovo Albanian expulsions).
At one point, the United States offered to airlift 20,000 people to a military base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but few refugees wanted to avail themselves of this option. Id
The UNHCR objected to a U.S. proposal to house Kosovars in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
on grounds that such a place would become a "rights free zone, where babies born have
no citizenship and the people are open to abuse." Id.
260. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES EVALUATION AND POL-
iCY AND ANALYSIS UNIT, THE Kosovo REFUGEE CRISIS: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF
UNHCR's EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE EPAU/2000/001 6 (Feb. 2000)
[hereinafter UNHCR EVALUATION] (remarking that half million people arrived in
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European Union took steps to contain the flows within the re-
gion through various assistance programs. 6'
Macedonia and Albania were the two principle asylum states
for Kosovar refugees. 62 Experts note that, as a small and some-
what unstable state, it was difficult for Macedonia to accommo-
date Kosovar refugees.263  The protection that Macedonia af-
forded the refugees was in the form of burden-sharing arrange-
ments.2 64  Instead of focusing on asylum, the plan allowed
refugees to enter on the condition that some would be sent on
to third countries,2 65 such as Germany, Greece, Norway, and
Turkey.2 66
Commentators note that the NATO bombings caused the
dislocation of not only Kosovo Albanians but also Serbians as
well.267 Hungary shouldered the burden of many Serbians flee-
ing Yugoslavia.268 In particular, many refugees left Serbia's
Vojvodina region where there was a distinct, ethnically Hun-
garian minority.269 Other groups settling in Hungary's camps in-
cluded middle-class Serbians, members of political opposition
groups, and draft evaders.270
5. Serbian Conscientious Objectors
During the 1999 air strikes, NATO encouraged draftable
neighboring areas in course of about two weeks and within two more weeks, total was
over 850,000). After nine weeks of air strikes, nearly 860,000 Kosovo Albanians fled or
were expelled to Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Id. at 6.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 10-11.
263. Id. at 10; see John Tagliabue, Alive and Ailing in the Balkans, N.Y. Tmis, June
27, 1999, at 4 (describing widespread poverty in Macedonia). Macedonia has a 35%
unemployment rate. Id.
264. Tagliabue, supra note 263. See also UNHCR EVALUATxON, supra note 260, at
xii (suggesting that burden-sharing can be very useful for states that are faced with
significant refugee inflows).
265. See UNCHR EVALUATION, supra note 260, at 11 (discussing that solution was
urged by United States and was at odds with UNHCR's general position focusing em-
phasizing obligations of first asylum states).
266. Id at 36.
267. SeeJohn Tagliabue, Hungary, on NATO Conflict s Front Line, Feels a Sense of Anxi-
ety, N.Y. TiMEs, May 2, 1999, at A16 (reporting waves of Serbians and ethnic Hungarians
fled from Yugoslavia to Hungary either to avoid conscription or for other politically
motivated reasons).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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Serbian men either to desert the military or to refuse conscrip-
tion.2 7 1 NATO carried out a leaflet airdrop by scattering flyers
around Belgrade and elsewhere bearing the NATO logo along
with messages that encouraged illegal27 2 resistance.2 73  In addi-
don every evening during Operation Allied Force, Serbians
could tune their televisions to NATO television for and-war pro-
gramming.27 4 Many draftable men fled, and of those who
271. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2 (discussing NATO's encouragement of draft
evasion).
272. See id. (reporting that Yugoslav penalties for ignoring draft summons range
from one to 10 years imprisonment; five years for avoiding call up by going into hiding;
punishment of five to 20 years for fleeing to another country or staying abroad to avoid
call-up). The Amnesty Report also claims that several hundred conscientious objectors
are in prison for refusing to serve in the military. Id.; see also Schmetzer, supra note 23,
at 4 (discussing military tribunals set up in Belgrade to hasten prosecutions of objec-
tors). Draft evaders are tried in absentia and the results are not made public.
Schmetzer, supra. One objector criticized that the government "can't possibly prose-
cute 40,000 people. So now it's become a selective process." Id.
273. Amnesty Report, supra note 2. According to the report, one such NATO leaf-
let dropped near Belgrade in April 1999 read: "In recent weeks, Serbian police and the
army, under direct orders of Slobodan Milosevic, have emptied villages and towns in
Kosovo, burning or destroying thousands of houses .... don't let wrongly directed
patriotism land you with his crimes." Id. Others read: "more than 13,000 members of
the Yugoslav army have already defected. Stay here and leave your bones or run away as
soon as you can. . . ." Id. "[O]ver 13,000 Yugoslavian [sic] service members have al-
ready left the armed forces because they can no longer follow illegal orders in
Milosevic's war against civilians in Kosovo. Leave your unit and your equipment and get
out of Kosovo now. If you choose to stay, NATO will relentlessly attack you from every
direction. The choice is yours." Id. Additionally, President Clinton's March 1999 ad-
dress broadcast by satellite to Serbians commented,
He [Milosevic] could have kept Kosovo in Serbia and given you peace. But
instead, he has jeopardized Kosovo's future and brought you more war. Right
now he's forcing your sons to keep fighting a senseless conflict that you did
not ask for and that he could have prevented... I call on all Serbs and all
people of good will to join with us in seeking an end to this needless and
avoidable conflict.
Id. Secretary of State Albright similarly recorded a broadcast on Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe
I believe your leaders are not telling the truth. We do not want to harm the
Serb people. But our nations cannot stand by while thousands of innocent
people are killed or driven into exile. That is what the Serbs are doing in
Kosovo. Your state media will not tell you this. But the world knows it is the
truth.
Id. But see Carlotta Gall, NATO TVIs Sent to Serbs, Who Are Harsh Critics, N.Y. Tims, May
26, 1999, at A17 (mentioning NATO-dropped fliers over Belgrade failed to make
favorable impression on some Serbian students).
274. See Gall, supra note 273, at A17 (chronicling near-comic nature of some of
broadcasted propaganda. "A colored map of Yugoslavia appears on the screen ....
Cheerful pop music plays in the background"); see also Free Serbia Net, (visited on Feb.
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sought refuge, most of them did so in Montenegro and in Hun-
gary.275 The UNHCR estimates that 50,000 Serbians fled Serbia
during the bombing.276 Of those fleeing the country, some esti-
mates suggest that 15,000 to 20,000 were draft evaders, and more
than 1000 were documented in Hungarian refugee camps.277
Commentators are unable to calculate how many refugees en-
tered Hungary either with valid passports and stayed on with
friends or family, or entered illegally and never contacted refu-
gee officials.2 78
Currently, the Serbian conscientious objectors' future in
Hungary is uncertain, and many are effectively stranded without
employment or permanent residency.279 Asylum protection in
Hungary is unlikely, as about two percent of all Serbian appli-
cants were granted asylum from January to May 1999.211 Many of
the draft evaders were granted permission to stay in Hungary for
up to ninety days, but did not qualify for authorization to
work.28 1 After the official stay expires, however, refugees are not
deported in keeping with non-refoulement principles.8 2 The
Hungarian government granted some draft evaders one-year re-
newable temporary permits on humanitarian grounds.2 3 Travel
visas to move out of Hungary and to Western states are similarly
difficult to obtain, as most states are not open to accepting addi-
tional refugees from this region.28 4
15, 2000) <http://www.freeserbia.net/Documents/Kosovo/Broadcasts.hnl> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (claiming that Voice of America and Radio
Free Europe broadcasted pro-NATO information into Yugoslavia during bombings).
275. See Montenegrin Assembly Adopts Amnesty Law, supra note 24 (reporting that un-
like Montenegro, status of Serbian conscientious objectors in Hungary is unresolved;
Montenegrin assembly passed amnesty law for conscientious objectors during NATO
campaign, so that no one would be sent back to Serbia to face punishment for avoiding
military service).
276. Schapiro, supra note 13.
277. See Adam Lebor, War in Europe: Serb Liberals Take Refuge Abroad, INDEPENDENT,
May 2, 1999, at 19 (noting that this figure only includes those who have been processed
through official agencies).
278. Hungarian Refugee, supra note 13.
279. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2 (discussing conscientious objectors' options
in refugee camps).
280. See Schapiro, supra note 13 (noting that there were 2315 asylum applicants
from March 24, 1999 to June 20, 1999).
281. See id. (reporting that between 100,000 and 300,000 men have fled Serbia
during since first war in 1991).
282. Mistiaen, supra note 14, at A19.
283. Id.
284. See Schapiro, supra note 13 (discussing difficulty in obtaining visas).
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Commentators note the difficulties attendant to living in
refugee camps.2815 Refugees who have little money cannot afford
to pay for transportation to Budapest from the camps to visit the
embassies and investigate immigration options.286 Likewise,
these refugees cannot go home.287 By crossing the border into
Hungary, the Serbian draft evaders violated a law imposed by the
Serbian government during the NATO bombing, that prohib-
ited males between sixteen and sixty-five from leaving the coun-
try.288 The punishment for this act is imprisonment, with
sentences ranging from one to twenty years.289 Additionally,
these Serbian draft evaders were vilified in the Serbian media as
traitors. 90 In July 1999, the Serbian government initiated expe-
dited proceedings to put draft evaders on trial for avoiding ser-
vice during the Kosovo war. 291 Evaders have been tried in absen-
tia, the proceedings are not open to the public, and most impor-
tantly, the results are not disclosed to the general public.292 If an
objector returned home, then he may not realize that he had
been tried, convicted, and sentenced for a crime.293
II. THE INDIVIDUALIZED AND COLLECTIVZED
APPROACHES: TWO METHODS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
Currently, states protect refugees on an individualized ba-
sis.294 Each country, in keeping with its commitment to the 1951
Convention, 1967 Protocol, and other human rights instru-
ments, chooses its own procedures for handling Convention ref-
285. SeeTheresaAgovino, Serb Deserters FearRevenge, Hous. CHRON.,June 9, 1999, at
A30 (discussing difficulties refugees have in ascertaining immigration and asylum infor-
mation).
286. Id.
287. See Schapiro, supra note 13 (stating that military age males were only allowed
out of country in exceptional cases); Gregor Mayer, Vojvodina Hungarians Feel Neglected
by Mother Country, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, June 16, 1999; Steven Erlanger, Serb Con-
scripts Assert Patriotism While Avoiding Army in Safe Houses, N.Y. Timrs, Apr. 5, 1999 (ana-
lyzing ambivalence of some Serbian draft evaders).
288. See Amnesty Report, supra note 2 (discussing penalties for draft evasion).
289. Id.
290. Schmetzer, supra note 23.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Deborah Anker et. al., Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and
Schuck, 11 HARv. Hu. RTs.J. 295, 295 (1998) (stating that current system for assessing
and granting refugee claims is determined by individual states).
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ugees or those fleeing generalized violence and war.29- Critics of
the current individualized approach argue that the individual-
ized basis, upon which refugee claims are managed, is no longer
tenable in the post Cold War world and suggest that nations
should properly channel their resources to a new collectivized
solution. 296 The more traditional, individualized approach fo-
cuses on asylum, whereas the collectivized approach affords refu-
gees temporary protection in anticipation of repatriation. 9 7
A. The Individualized Approach
Currently, the protection afforded refugees is individual-
ized.298 Thus, obligations to protect refugees, such as those cre-
ated by the 1951 Convention refugee definition or the principle
of non-refoulement, are considered universal, whereas the actual
formula for protection is provided by individual states.2 9 Schol-
ars frequently acknowledge that the current practices do not ad-
equately protect refugees and are in need of reformulation. 00
Even those scholars who believe in the foundations of current
refugee protection recognize that it is uneven and decentral-
ized.30 1 A person has an internationally recognized right to
leave a country, but no right of admission to another country.
30 2
Currently no umbrella system exists to receive and confer refu-
295. See id. (noting 1951 Convention forms basic legal standards for refugee pro-
tection).
296. See James C. Hathaway & R Alexander Neve, Making international Refugee Law
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 Hv. HUM.
RTS. J. 115, 115 (1997) (outlining new system for international refugee protection); see
also Peter H. Schuck, Refugee-Burden-sharing, 22 YALEJ. IN-'L L. 243, 244-45 (1997) (pro-
posing system of refugee protection that equitably distributes burden of their care
among states).
297. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 117-18 (positing approach to refugee
protection that emphasizes temporary protection). But see Anker et aL, supra note 294,
at 295 (maintaining that asylum is preferable protection mechanism).
298. Anker et al., supra note 294.
299. See generally id. 294 at 305 (noting that although present protections are de-
centralized, states still accept responsibility for those refugees that qualify for protection
in their territory).
300. See Schuck, supra note 296, at 251 (stating that individuals and organizations
have criticized current refugee protection system). See generally Helton, supra note 92
(arguing that existing system of refugee protection is not capable of managing mass
movements of those fleeing their homes).
301. See Anker et al., supra note 294, at 299 (agreeing with criticism that states
have improperly refouled refugees because refugee protection standards are not uni-
form).
302. Helton, supra note 92, at 1624.
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gee protection.0 3 The mechanisms in effect currently depend
on the policies of a given nation, so that states may fashion a
policy of swift admission, immediate repatriation, or opt for
something in between both of these measures.8 0 4 States have
this option because the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
do not discuss restrictive policies that states may employ to pre-
vent the influx of refugees, such as inflexible visa requirements
or interdiction at sea. 0 5
Proponents of maintaining an individualized approach to
refugee protection acknowledge failures in the current asylum
scheme, but allege that it ultimately saves lives by granting asy-
lum to many refugees3 ° 6 and also protects state sovereignty.30 7
In any case, proponents claim that there is not enough evidence
to support the notion that an additional regional organization
comprised of states will provide efficiently any more protection
than individual states now provide. 08 They argue that the legal
framework established by the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol is adequate protection if only states would honor their
international legal obligations.0 9
Advocates of the current system point out that an alterna-
303. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (vis-
ited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://unhchr.ch/html/hchr.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national LawJournal) (discussing one of functions of UNHCHR is to respond to serious
violations of human rights). The UNHCHR approximates an international framework
for refugee protection. Id. See generally Helton, supra note 92, at 1627 (arguing in favor
of new international regime by underscoring point that, despite multitude of interna-
tional instruments setting out standards for treatment of refugees and despite multilat-
eral arrangements in Asia and other agreements among some Western European states,
there is no great deal of international harmonization of refugee protection).
304. See SatvinderJuss, Toward a Morally Legitimate Reform of Refugee Law: The Uses of
Cultural Jurisprudence, 11 HARv. HuM. RTs.J. 311, 313 (1998) (noting that since end of
Cold War many states have chosen policies of repatriation over policies of admission).
305. Id.; see generally Helton, supra note 92, at 1625 (noting another ambiguity in
current refugee regime, worth mentioning, although beyond scope of this Note, is lack
of protection afforded internally displaced-those who have been forced from their
homes, but have not crossed international border).
306. Anker et al., supra note 294, at 299.
307. See Bill Frelick, "Preventative Protection" and the Right To Seek Asylum: A Prelimi-
nay Look at Bosnia and Croatia, 4 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 439, 440 (1992) (noting that many
people believe that guarding state borders is crucial government responsibility). But see
Shuck, supra note 296, at 247 (noting that to some human rights advocates, modem
nation states are main human rights violators).
308. See Anker et. al., supra note 294, at 300 (arguing that best way to reform refu-
gee protection is to improve upon current framework).
309. Id. at 309.
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tive, such as the emphasis of the collectivized scheme on tempo-
rary protection, is misguided because so many crises are long-
term and each crisis is fact specific. 3 10 They note that civil unrest
lasts for years, and it cannot be expected that governments
should repatriate refugees before it is safe to do so, or that refu-
gees should remain under temporary protection, possibly for as
many as five years, without the hope of permanent residence.3 1
Advocates of the individualized system argue that there are nu-
merous legitimate reasons for refugees to seek asylum in devel-
oped states because they provide due process and other legal
safeguards for refugees.31 2
B. The Collectivized Approach
Scholars have proposed a collectivized approach to refugee
protection composed of an international commitment to tempo-
rary protection, policies to promote repatriation, and a shared
financial burden for protecting refugees.31 3 Collectivized solu-
tions to migration that apportion the burden of refugee care are
not new, but in recent years, such theories have assumed a more
prominent position in refugee discourse.31 4 Moreover, a unified
system would create a single standard for determining asylum
when appropriate, thereby eliminating many of the current in-
consistencies.3
15
310. See id. (asserting particularized nature of refugee law and arguing that each
emergency calls for its own specifically tailored solution). Additionally, a new burden-
sharing system is unlikely to become accepted by states, or to become a substitute for
the conventions, and customary international law that has emerged over time. Id.
311. See id. at 302 (noting that, for example, refugee flows from Afghanistan, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, and Vietnam lasted longer than standard five year period under
most temporary protection schemes).
312. See id. at 305 (noting that regionally based collectivized schemes could deny
legal safeguards to refugees forced to seek asylum in poorer nations).
313. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 117 (indicating that authors propose
shift away from refugee status leading to permanent residence). The authors, instead
assert that an emphasis on temporary protection would enable states to treat refugee
protection more expansively. Id.; see generally Kenneth Regensburg, Note, Refugee Law
Reconsidered: Reconciling Humanitarian Objectives with the Protectionist Agenda of Western Eu-
rope and the United States, 29 CORNELL ITrr'L L.J. 225 (1996) (arguing in favor of equita-
ble burden-sharing whereby states agree to pay into fund to assist poorer states to man-
age influx of refugees during crisis).
314. See Schuck, supra note 296, at 297 (contending that equitable burden-sharing
concept, although noble, is not new).
315. See Regensburg, supra note 313, at 258 (arguing that properly administered
burden-sharing program would further human rights goals); Asha Hans & Astri Suhrke,
Responsibility Sharing, in, RECONVEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAw 83, 83-4 (James C.
2000] SERBIAN CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 1489
1. Background
Scholars note that the origin of a collectivized theory is two-
fold: many governments believe that a resolute commitment to
refugee protection is akin to a relinquishment of their ability as
sovereign states to control their borders; and second, neither the
admission of refugees, nor the financial costs associated with car-
ing for them is justly allocated among nations.316 A collectivized
approach rests on the theory that refugee law is no longer em-
braced by many states because current procedures cannot bal-
ance the rights of those fleeing en masse with the obligations of
the states forced to receive them.317 With a collectivized model,
scholars argue that host states can focus on preserving the
human rights of refugees 318 without revamping their immigra-
tion policy each time there is a mass migration of people due to
a humanitarian crisis.3 19 Additionally, scholars argue that the
current state of refugee law and the preference for asylum pro-
tection imposes an unsupportable burden on poor states.320 A
collectivized solution to the problem of migrants en masse shares
the costs of caring and of managing refugees among many na-
tions, and does not concentrate solely on the regions from
whence they have fled. 21 Proponents of a collectivized model
Hathaway ed. 1997) (asserting that most refugee movements can be characterized as
spontaneous and anarchical). These authors urge a non-spontaneous refugee distribu-
tion, one entered into by states, international organizations, and non-governmental or-
ganizations. Hans & Suhrke, supra. This type of system would require wealthier, indus-
trialized states to assist more substantially during refugee crises. Id. The assistance of
wealthier nations is important because most refugee crises originate in and remain con-
centrated in poorer states. Id.
316. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 116 (asserting that many states view
refugee protection as end run to permanent immigration). This perception conflicts
with a state's efforts to tailor admission on the basis of economic or other factors. Id.
317. Id.
318. See generally Schuck, supra note 296, at 271 (affirming importance of ensuring
human rights principles). A component of a collectivized approach would ensure that
refugees would actually receive the protections they are permitted in international law.
Id.
319. See generally Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 117 (noting that this is one
of reasons that refugee law has fallen out of favor internationally).
320. See id. at 115 (arguing that collectivized efforts to date have not been suffi-
cient); see also Schuck, supra note 296, at 265 (arguing that asylum eligibility is only
small portion of those who ever obtain protection, although traditional refugee law
centers around asylum qualifications). Thus, asylum is no longer as relevant to refugee
movements, as it once was. Schuck, supra.
321. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 141 (discussing that currently, least
developed states bear brunt of caring for most of world's refugees).
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argue that since receiving states are increasingly hostile to refu-
gees and routinely violate their human rights, a solution empha-
sizing temporary protection would encourage states to be more
receptive to refugees because these states will not be expected to
house them permanently.32
2
The reality for many refugees, especially for those who flee
in large groups as a result of intense political trauma, is that
their efforts for protection in other states are met with formida-
ble barriers preventing them from ever reaching potential asy-
lum states.323 The end result for many refugees is uncertainty: if
they are able to cross the border then they face warehousing,3 24
an increasingly prevalent fact of refugee schemes in many
states.325 An additional feature of the current refugee protec-
tion system allows states to refuse entry to asylum-seekers who
have not arrived directly from the persecuting country.3 26 The
effect is that governments may remove them to safe-third coun-
tries, where they are not refouled, but are forced instead to seek
assistance in a country not of their choice.327
Scholars note that the resolution to temporary protection is
repatriation. 28 On the most basic level, repatriation requires
the home country to undergo substantial political changes.329
Presently, states offer permanent resettlement as an option if
322. See Schuck, supra note 296, at 266 (asserting that temporary protection is real-
istic approach to refugee flows). Realistically, national self-interest dictates that indus-
trialized states will resist attempts to protect and permanently resettle additional refu-
gees. Id. A plan that humanly cares for them near the country from whence they have
fled, however, could draw political support by industrialized states. Id.
323. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 119 (recognizing that attempts at
excluding refugees entirely are effective way for states to dodge protecting refugees).
324. See id. at 130 (defining warehousing as term used to describe situations where
refugees have no right to integrate in asylum state, but are not likely to be returned to
their country of origin).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 120
327. See id. at 120-21 (contending that practical effect of safe third country pro-
ceedings is that refugees are moved disproportionately from states in North and in
Western Europe to states in Southern Hemisphere and Central and Eastern Europe).
328. See Hailbronner, supra note 146, at 81 (asserting that temporary protection
should be one element in approach, involving international community that involves
burden-sharing and international assistance to states affected); see Schuck, supra note
296, at 265 (arguing that TPS emphasizing repatriation generally assists asylum states
refugees flee to first). These first asylum states are likely to be near the refugee's coun-
try of origin. Schuck, supra. It is less costly to move a refugee home if repatriation
becomes available and the refugee is located close to his or her country of origin. Id.
329. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 131-32 (noting that repatriation and
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safe repatriation is not possible within a reasonable number of
years.3 8 0 Ultimately, different states handle the types of protec-
tion and the extent of the protection, differently.331 By focusing
on repatriation when the eventual threat to the refugees has
abated, refugees can then be sent home to resettle.3 2 This way a
central objective is reached: refugees have a temporary sanctu-
ary with a host that is more willing to embrace them because it is
uniformly understood at the outset that their stay will not be per-
manent.3 3
3
2. Burden-Sharing
A collectivized theory of refugee protection is concerned
with providing temporary safety and focuses on the goal of repa-
triation. 3 4 Some advocates of this system emphasize that no
convention or international instrument prevents governments
from banding together to forge an alliance to manage refugee
crises.3 35 Additionally, this approach considers how the burden
of caring for refuges is allocated. 3 6
Scholars note that the collectivized tactic entails the balanc-
ing of two elements: responsibility sharing,337 which concerns
resettlement post-civil war is especially difficult considering human rights violations per-
petrated by citizens against citizens).
330. See id. at 132 (arguing that if repatriation is not tenable within reasonable
number of years, then refugees should obtain permanent resettlement option).
331. See id. (noting that Norway and Denmark allow those receiving temporary
protection for several years to apply for permanent residence). France, Germany, and
the United States, however, do not have a system in place whereby TPS translates into
permanent status. Id
332. See id at 138 (asserting that tenable and human refugee protection system
should not have irreparably to change receiving state's demographic composition).
333. Id. at 139.
334. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 130 (noting however, that repatria-
tion may not succeed if political situation has not stabilized).
335. See id. at 169 (arguing that sharing burdens and responsibilities of refugee
management is consistent with accepted principles in international law).
336. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 141 (noting that states located in
southern hemisphere tend to bear greater refugee burden because of their geographi-
cal location).
337. See Schuck, supra note 296, at 257-58 (arguing that otherwise successful
Vietnamese refugee protection schemes suffered when some of states in region ne-
glected their responsibilities). In 1989, the Malaysian government refused to accept
Vietnamese refugees. Id. This act, in turn, triggered other states in the region to gain
an increase of Vietnamese refugees. Id. States in an effective burden-sharing scheme
must recognize the interdependence of their actions and the ramifications if one state
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safe and humane refugee protection, and burden sharing,3.
which is the real cost of attaining this goal.33 9 Under this ap
proach, proponents note that associations of states would agree
to share in their region's refugee responsibilities. 4 ° States be-
longing to these associations would not have to shoulder the
burden of a mass influx alone, but would be part of a system that
would distribute the responsibility of their care equitably.
3 41
Such a system would include a binding guarantee of financial
assistance from association members who do not have the physi-
cal refugee presence.342 Each country's contribution would be
limited to what it could reasonably afford.343 Adherents to this
type of system would still abide by the 1951 Convention's non-
refoulement obligation.3 '
Scholars recognize that the impact of refugee movements
either indirectly or directly affects all states.3 45 Generally, poorer
states, those bordering on areas of conflict and states in the
South, are affected the most because they receive the most refu-
gees. 46 The fiscal burden that a state faces when it accepts
waves of refugees is not typically shared with other states.3 47
departs from an agreed plan. Id. at 258; see also Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at
144-45 (stating need for responsibility sharing of refugee protection).
338. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296 (discussing that tenable burden sharing
requires methods to reduce refugee burden on small group of nations by spreading it
out among many); see also id. at 144 (stating need for scheme to distribute effectively
costs among nations for refugee care).
339. See i&L at 144-45 (referring to regional associations as interest convergence
groups). This approach recognizes that not all states can provide equal assistance to
the incoming refugees. Id.
340. See id& at 146 (stating that under this approach states would grant temporary
protection, accept refugees that cannot return home, or help fund burden-sharing sys-
tem).
341. See id. at 144 (stating that state's level of assistance would depend on their
capability).
342. Id.
343. See id. at 145 (arguing that under this system industrialized states agree to
fund burden-sharing along with developing states' governments who instead agree to
host refugees in return for access to responsibility sharing scheme).
344. See id. (proposing that in addition to respecting non-refoulement principle,
governments would be required to respect refugee's basic human rights).
345. See Regensburg, supra note 313, at 261 (arguing that mass refugee flows affect
state's national interests and therefore, universal questions call for universal responses).
346. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 141 (mentioning that poorest states
have greatest legal refugee burden); Schuck, supra note 296, at 253 (stating that only
small number of nations ever assume burden of caring for bulk of refugees and those
states are some of least capable, financially, to handle influx).
347. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 296, at 141.
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Also, UNHCR's assistance is not always distributed equitably.3 1
III. A HYBRID OF THE INDIVIDUALIZED AND
COLLECTIIZED APPROA CHES WILL PROVIDE A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SERBIAN
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
A hybrid approach to the dilemma facing Serbian conscien-
tious objectors requires NATO states to recognize a duty owed to
those who refused to participate in a war condemned by the in-
ternational community as contrary to basic standards of human
conduct. 49 NATO states should adopt an approach that recog-
nizes the Serbian conscientious objectors' right to object selec-
tively to war, that acknowledges their contribution to NATO's
effort, and that shares the burden of their care among NATO
Member States. Like the individualized approach discussed in
Part II(A) of this Note, this scheme promotes asylum as the ulti-
mate solution for Serbian conscientious objectors.350 Like the
collectivized approach discussed in Part II(B), however, NATO
nations should jointly share the burden of caring for the objec-
tors.3 -5 States such as Hungary should not, by geographical de-
fault, be compelled to shoulder this burden alone.
A. The Hybrid Approach
A hybrid approach evolves from the broader problem con-
cerning the effective management of refugee flows in a post-
Cold War world.352 After World War II, the United Nations and
the international community devised a method of assisting refu-
348. See id. at 141 (noting that often funds from UNHCHR are not allocated on
basis of need). According to 1993 UNHGR expenditures, more UNHCHR funds were
directed to refugee protection in European states than to refugees in Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East. Id. These regions house three times more refugees than are housed
in Europe. Id. The UNHCHR contributed less funding to assist the approximately 1.7
million refugees in Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire than it did on assisting those from the
former Yugoslavia, in 1995. Id.
349. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (discussing recognition of con-
scientious objection when individual refuses to participate in military activity contrary
to basic standards of human activity).
350. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (referring to individualized ap-
proach's emphasis on asylum).
351. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text (outlining contours of collectiv-
ized theory of refugee protection).
352. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing shift in attitude to-
wards refugee following break up of Soviet bloc).
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gees facing persecution, focusing on asylum status for those
meeting the 1951 Convention refugee definition. 3  The influx
of refugees to Western Europe and elsewhere has increased
since the Soviet Union's disintegration.3 54 Additionally, because
the political benefit to receiving states is not as great as it once
was during the Cold War era, many nations are less inclined to
accept refugees.
The Serbian conscientious objector dilemma is an illustra-
tion of a problem not yet addressed by the international commu-
nity. The two principle models for managing refugee crises are
not capable of resolving this issue. The individualized approach
fails to address adequately the burden large numbers of refugees
place on receiving states when forced from their countries of ori-
gin because of generalized violence or civil war. The collectiv-
ized approach fails to resolve the plight of those who have fled
generalized violence or civil war due to political persecution.
Temporary protection is not a solution if these refugees will be
persecuted upon their return. A hybrid approach, emphasizing
burden sharing and asylum, recognizes that individualized perse-
cution may stem from civil conflict. A burden sharing scheme
would redistribute the duty of caring for refugees among several
states.355 Arguably, more states would be willing to offer assist-
ance if they were required to care for fewer people. In addition,
a hybrid approach recognizes that such care may require offer-
ing asylum, not temporary protection, to these refugees. Consci-
entious objectors, for example, may face criminal persecution
long after the conflict precipitating their departure has ended.
B. Serbian Conscientious Objectors Were Justified in Fleeing Serbia
During Operation Allied Force
Serbian conscientious objectors face a difficult and uncer-
tain future.35 6 States, including Hungary, although bound by
353. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of classic
refugee definition following massive population displacements caused by World War
II).
354. See supra notes 151 and accompanying text (noting increase in refugees since
end of Cold War).
355. See supra notes 337-44 and accompanying text (discussing elements of burden
sharing scheme that would distribute refugee caring responsibilities among many
states).
356. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (illustrating Serbian conscien-
tious objectors' plight).
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the principle of non-refoulement, have not offered Serbian ob-
jectors legal permanent residence or asylum. This situation oc-
curs despite the fact that they are living within their borders, and
face severe criminal penalties if they return home.
357
Objection to military service is based on political opinion. A
well-founded fear of persecution due to one's political opinion is
one of the five recognized categories an asylum seeker may claim
in order to qualify as a refugee under international law, and
under the domestic laws of many states.3 58 The U.N. Handbook
discusses the notion of selective conscientious objection to mili-
tary service. Although a sovereign state may legally require mili-
tary service, the U.N. Handbook recognizes that an objector may
qualify as a refugee if he or she objects to a military action that
the international community deems contrary to basic standards
of human activity.3
59
Given that Serbian wartime atrocities are well docu-
mented, 60 Serbians, who refused to participate in this military
infliction of horror on civilians, fall within a recognized excep-
tion to the rule that governments can require military service
from their citizens. Additionally, there is credible evidence to
suggest that during Operation Allied Force, NATO distributed
leaflets and propaganda encouraging Serbians to desert the mili-
tary or to resist the draft entirely.36 The campaign's purpose
was to expressly encourage military draft evasion and desertion.
Arguably, many Serbians heeded this call and fled.
A skeptic of selective conscientious objection might argue
that during civil war, or generalized violence, any draft age male
outside his country of origin would automatically qualify as a
1951 Convention refugee. Consequently, this would result in a
sizeable exception to the classic Convention refugee definition
whereby nearly half a population would qualify for refugee sta-
357. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (describing criminal penalties for
resisting Serbian draft).
358. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (defining refugee according to
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
359. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (mentioning U.N. Handbook's rec-
ognition of selective objection).
360. See supra notes 237-46 and accompanying text (examining Serbian perpe-
trated war crimes and human rights abuses).
361. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text (describing extent of NATO's
campaign to encourage draft evasion).
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tus.16 2 This position is problematic for several reasons. Serbian
men risked their lives by refusing military service in a war they
opposed. 63 Their actions conferred a benefit on NATO inter-
vention, i.e., fewer soldiers arguably assisted in weakening
Milosevic's military strength. Therefore, these individuals, albeit
indirectly, assisted in NATO's effort. Secondly, considering the
Serbian military's history of human rights abuses, individuals re-
fusing to participate in such a military regime should be com-
mended and protected by the international community.
Most importantly, in circumstances where the international
community has intervened militarily in a conflict concerning
human rights, an exception allowing refugee protection for con-
scientious objectors would be reasonable and limited. Techni-
cally, objectors who are outside their country of origin, owing to
a well-founded fear of persecution based on their political opin-
ion-in this case, refusal to engage in military activity long con-
demned by many states and the subject of international military
response-qualify as 1951 Convention refugees. Thus, Serbian
conscientious objectors presently housed in Hungarian refugee
camps qualify as Convention refugees. Nevertheless, for a variety
of practical and political reasons, this group has not been af-
forded a viable immigration option.3 64
C. NATO States Should Assume the Burden of Caring for Serbian
Conscientious Objectors
States are reluctant to assume a permanent burden of car-
ing for Serbian conscientious objectors, particularly states neigh-
boring the war-torn former Yugoslavia, partly because they have
been inundated with exiles fleeing this region over the past dec-
ade.365 Unlike many others who fled to escape generalized vio-
lence, these objectors face near certain criminal persecution
based on their political beliefs if they return home. The issue
362. See supra notes 18 and accompanying text (stating that males age 18 to 65
were draft eligible during Operation Allied Force).
363. See supra notes 5-9, 18-20 and accompanying text (recounting Serbian objec-
tors' encounters with police and their reasons for fleeing Serbia).
364. See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text (noting reluctance of states to
accept additional refugees from Balkan region).
365. See supra notes 97, 149 and accompanying text (illustrating problem of refu-
gee flows caused by Balkan civil wars).
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becomes one of fair apportionment of the burden of care, so
that states effectively may offer the objectors a tenable solution.
NATO states should bear some responsibility in caring for
and protecting Serbian objectors who defected from the military
during the war. A scheme that accepts the individualized ap-
proach's emphasis on asylum, while shifting the burden of refu-
gee care away from the bordering states to all NATO states, is a
more humane and equitable solution. A plan to allocate the
burden of care among NATO states also could be in the form of
financial assistance with equitable distribution of funds in pro-
portion to the number of refugees each state receives. This
scheme would benefit states, such as Hungary, who are currently
caring for many objectors. Alternatively, other states could ac-
cept some of the objectors.5 66
CONCLUSION
Sadly, ethnic cleansing campaigns are not exclusive to the
Balkan wars. If past is prologue, then such atrocities are likely to
occur again in another part of the world. A policy of granting
asylum to a defector who refuses to engage in genocide is just; it
would also help drain an aggressor state's military strength. Dur-
ing Operation Allied Force, Serbian conscientious objectors in-
directly assisted NATO's efforts by heeding NATO's call to resist
the draft or to desert. If they return home now, then they will be
criminally prosecuted. Enduring refugee status, or refugee-like
status, is untenable. Therefore NATO states should recognize
their obligation to share in the burden of care, insuring optimal
protection for the objectors.
Unlike the burden-sharing scheme set out in Part II(B) of
this Note, the abiding solution should be asylum, not temporary
protection and eventual repatriation. Draft evasion and deser-
tion are criminal offenses, leaving conscientious objectors little
choice but to flee Serbia. Perhaps the political situation in Ser-
bia will change, and objectors will no longer face criminal prose-
cution for their actions. Judging from past refugee crises lasting
more than five years, and the present political situation, it seems
unlikely that this will occur. Requiring objectors to remain in a
situation of stateless uncertainty, hoping for a pardon by an irra-
366. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text (noting extent of refugee crisis
during bombing and discussing burden-sharing scheme employed to assist refugees).
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tional head of state, or expecting a dramatic change in Serbia's
political climate, is neither practical, nor humane. Therefore, a
hybrid plan, emphasizing asylum, while fairly apportioning the
burden of care, would recognize the significant contributions of
Milan, Goran, and the approximately 15,000 other Serbian con-
scientious objectors to the NATO effort.
